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I. INTRODUCTION
It is constitutional black letter law. To obtain a criminal
conviction, the prosecution must prove every element of the offense, by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution entitles a
defendant to confront and cross-examine all witnesses against him.
Yet, for the past thirty years, state legislatures have quietly approved
laws that cheat the Constitution. These laws fly, undetected, beneath
the constitutional radar, violating fundamental constitutional rights.
Although other constitutional cheats abound, this Article
examines one archetypical example of constitutional cheating: statutes
that permit state prosecutors to use hearsay state crime laboratory
reports, in lieu of live witness testimony, to prove essential elements
of a criminal case.' This Article characterizes these statutes as
forensic ipse dixit statutes, because the bare assertion of an uncross-
examined state witness becomes, ipse dixit, an adjudicated fact. 2 The
forensic ipse dixit statutes deprive defendants of the right to
confrontation and relieve the government of its burden of proof. These
statutes also discourage vigorous defense advocacy, promote
carelessness and fraud in crime laboratories, and increase the
likelihood of wrongful convictions and sentences.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the nationwide
forensic ipse dixit phenomenon. Part III addresses the unwarranted
presumption of reliability that legislatures and courts often accord to
forensic reports. Parts IV and V, respectively, discuss how the
forensic ipse dixit statutes violate the Confrontation and Due Process
clauses of the United States Constitution. Part VI offers observations
about what constitutional cheating reveals about our criminal justice
system.
Of course, there is also a story:
In December of 2002, an audit disclosed major discrepancies in
the forensic outcomes alleged by the Houston Police Department's
1. As discussed in Part II, this type of legislation governs forensic testing designed to
"match" evidence to a particular individual and forensic testing designed to "identify" evidence as
containing, in whole or in part, a particular chemical or physical substance. Particularly in
controlled substance and DUI cases, the forensic proof-by-certificate statutes raise relatively
straight-forward questions about reliability, confrontation, and the proof of elements.
2. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 743 (7th ed. 1999).
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crime laboratory ("HPD").3  Events in Texas soon snowballed,
disclosing widespread incompetence, carelessness, and fraud in
laboratories across the state. 4
Nevertheless, in April of 2003, without public fanfare, a Texas
state senator proposed a forensic ipse dixit statute that would permit
prosecutors to substitute state crime laboratory certificates for live
testimony. The certificate would prove both the chain of custody for
the tested substance and the truth of the state laboratory's
conclusions, without requiring a state crime examiner to even appear
in court for confrontation or cross-examination. 5
The Texas crime laboratory scandal continued to grow. The
Houston District Attorney's office explicitly acknowledged the HPD's
unreliability. The office refused to prosecute the hundreds of HPD-
tested drug cases pending on its docket unless an independent and
accredited crime laboratory conducted the forensic analysis.6  In
August of 2003, Texas's Department of Public Safety closed the HPD
toxicology division. 7 Shortly thereafter, the FBI announced that it
would no longer accept forensic testing reports from Texas
laboratories.
Nevertheless, in September of 2003, the Texas forensic ipse
dixit statute became law; the State is now permitted to prove its crime
laboratory's forensic conclusions without ever calling a laboratory
witness to testify and undergo cross-examination.8  Instead, an
unsworn laboratory report establishes the truth of the forensic report.
This forensic ipse dixit statute is not an absurd anomaly of
Texas law. Nearly every state in the union has enacted a version of
this forensic ipse dixit statute.
3. See Mike Glenn, Auditors find problems with HPD's crime lab, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Jan. 23, 2003, at A19 (reporting results of an audit conducted by the Texas Department of Public
Safety on the Houston Police Department's DNA and serology laboratory); see also Mike Glenn,
House hearings on HPD crime lab to focus on audit, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 3, 2003, at A15
(discussing measures to be taken by the House Committee to investigate and resolve audit
findings).
4. Id.
5. Criminal Jurisprudence Committee Report, Tex. Bill Analysis, 2003 Regular Sess., S.B.
1129.
6. Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, 'Trace' drug cases on hold, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July
3, 2003, at Al.
7. See Glenn, Auditors find problems with HPD's crime lab, supra note 3 (reporting results
of an audit conducted by the Texas Department of Public Safety on the Houston Police
Department's DNA and serology laboratory).
8. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (Vernon 2006). The statute excludes from its
ambit latent fingerprint examinations and certain breath analyses related to DUI offenses.
2006]
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II. THE FORENSIC IPSE DIXIT PHENOMENON
The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States
authorize the state to prove its forensic allegations by relying upon a
forensic certificate in lieu of live testimony. 9 Only six jurisdictions
have no forensic ipse dixit statute. 10 Sixteen states make a forensic
certificate proof of its forensic conclusions about matters more
9. Some jurisdictions authorize the introduction of a forensic certificate in lieu of live
testimony in the limited context of proving blood alcohol content in DUI prosecutions; others
authorize its use only to prove the chemical composition of controlled substances in drug
prosecutions. A third group of jurisdictions permits the use of a certificate in both of the
aforementioned situations, and a fourth group provides for blanket admissibility of forensic
reports in any type of prosecution. Forty-five jurisdictions allow admission of a forensic
certificate in at least one such type of prosecution: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 12-21-300 (2006);
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (2006); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-254 (2006);
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-707 (2006), ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-313 (2006); Colorado,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2006); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-283(b) (2006);
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4330-32 (2006); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-
905.06 (LexisNexis 2006); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.1934, 327.354 (West 2006); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2745 (2006); Illinois, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-15 (West 2000) (but
see People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 478 (Ill. 2000), holding the statute unconstitutional);
Iowa, IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2902a, 22-3437 (2006);
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (West 2006); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:499-15:501, 32:662 -32:663 (2006); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112 (2006), ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9057 (2006), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 205 (2006), ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2431 (2006); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-914, -1001 to -
1003 (West 2006); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 111 § 13 (2006), MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 90
§ 24 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90B, § 8 (2006),
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47A (2006); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625a, 600.2167
(2006); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 634.15-16 (2006); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 577.020,
577.037 (2006); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315,
50.320, 50.325 (2006); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 215-A:11-i, 265:92-a, 270:57
(2006); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-19 (West 2006); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. Ann. §§ 66-
8-110, 66-13-11 (LexisNexis 2006); New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney 2006),
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518, 4520 (McKinney 2006), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30 (McKinney 2006);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-95(g), 20-139.1 (2006); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 19-03.1-37, 39-20-07 (2006); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 751, 751.1 (West 2006), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754 (West 2006);
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.235, 40.460, 40.510 (2006); Pennsylvania, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1547 (West 2006); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-43 (2006); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23-3-19, 1-49-6 (2006); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-4079 40-35-311, 40-28-122
(2006); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (Vernon 2006); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 41-6a-515, 72-10-503 (2006); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1203 (2006), VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4816 (2006); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-268.7, 18.2-268.9, 19.2-187, 19.2-
187.01, 19.2-187.02, 19.2-187.2 (2006); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (2006); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (2006); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 970.03 (2006); Montana, MONT.
REV. 803(8) (2006); South Carolina, S.C. R. CRIM. PRO. 6 (2006); Washington, WASH. ST. SUPER.
CT. CRIM. R. 6.13 (2006), WASH. ST. CRIM. R. CTS. Lim. JuR. 6.13 (2006).
10. The six states without forensic ipse dixit statutes are California, Georgia, Hawaii,
Indiana, Illinois, and Mississippi. Two of those states, Illinois and Georgia, had forensic ipse dixit
statutes that were repealed after their respective supreme courts found the procedure
unconstitutional.
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scientifically complex and controversial than the correct identification
and weight of a controlled substance.11 Forensic ipse dixit certificates
can prove the results of DNA tests, microscopic hair analyses,
fingerprint identifications, coroners' reports, ballistics tests, and a
wide range of other tests conducted by a crime laboratory. 12 When
properly invoked, these statutes enable the prosecution to prove,
through a hearsay forensic report, both the chain of custody and the
"truth" of the forensic tester's conclusions. 13
Nationally, the forensic ipse dixit statutes share certain
structural characteristics. Once the prosecution provides any notice
required by the statute, the burden shifts to defense counsel to
demand that the prosecution honor its constitutional obligation of
calling witnesses to prove each element of the offense by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.
If all goes well for the prosecution, the State's forensic proof
process looks like this:
" At the request of a prosecutor or law enforcement officer, a State
laboratory (or a laboratory retained by the State) conducts one
or more forensic tests;
" The laboratory prepares a report reflecting its forensic
conclusions;
11. As discussed infra in Part III, correct identification of a controlled substance may itself
be a complex scientific question.
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-300 (2006) (any certificate of analysis performed by a state
or federal criminalist is allowed); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-254 (LexisNexis 2006) (report made by
chief of state health laboratory is prima facie proof of its contents); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-313
(2006) (any report made by state crime laboratories "shall be received as competent evidence");
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2006) (any report from the criminalistics laboratory shall be
received into evidence); IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006) (findings of the criminalistics laboratory shall
be received into evidence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3437 (2006) (report concerning "forensic
examinations" shall be received into evidence); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:499-15:501 (2006) (all
criminalistics laboratories, state or federal, are authorized to make proof of examinations and
analyses); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2167 (2006) (forensic reports permitted in preliminary and
grand jury hearings); MONT. REV. 803(8) (2006) (forensic reports incorporated into Montana's
codified public records are admissible); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518 (McKinney 2006) (state DNA test
results are prima facie proof of their contents); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30 (McKinney 2006)
(forensic reports admissible in grand jury hearings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 751.1 (West
2006) (DNA report from a forensic laboratory admissible as evidence of its contents); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 754 (West 2006) (medical examiner's report, autopsy, or other forensic
examination report is admissible as proof of its contents in DUI hearing); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23-3-19.3 (2006) (copy of report of state crime lab examination is prima facie proof of its
contents); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (Vernon 2006) (certificate of analysis made by
or for a law enforcement agency is admissible in evidence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (2006)
(forensic reports admissible in preliminary hearings); WIS. STAT. § 970.03(12)(c) (2006) (latent
fingerprint reports made by the Milwaukee police laboratory shall be received into evidence at a
preliminary hearing without calling the analyst who made the report).
13. As discussed in Part V, in some jurisdictions the introduction of the hearsay forensic
report requires the factfinder to assume the truth of the State's forensic conclusion.
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" That report conforms, in form and in substance, to the
requirements of the relevant state statute;
" The State complies with any applicable pretrial notice
requirements;
* At trial, the State introduces the hearsay report;
* The report proves the chain of custody for the evidence tested;
* The report proves the truth of the laboratory's forensic
conclusions;
* No State witness ever testifies about the testing methodology,
the testing equipment, or the error rates associated with the
testing;
* No State witness ever testifies about the tester's experience,
education, or work performance;
• The hearsay forensic report creates, either de facto or de jure, a
presumption that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the truth of the report's conclusions.
The desire for cheaper and quicker criminal trials drives the
forensic ipse dixit phenomenon. 14 Almost universally, legislators,
prosecutors, and courts offer the same justifications for the forensic
ipse dixit procedure: the purported reliability of forensic tests;15 the
infrequency of defense challenges to forensic conclusions; 16 and the
financial costs of requiring forensic examiners to appear in court.
17
True, governors, prosecutors, and courts now routinely acknowledge
wrongful convictions that are based on faulty science or perjured
14. See cases cited infra note 16.
15. See, e.g., State v. Hancock, 825 P.2d 648, 651 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that
Oregon enacted its forensic ipse dixit statute in part, because of the purported rarity of drug
misidentification); State v. Hudson, 2002 WL 472304, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2002)
(discussing the courts' long-standing assumption of the "trustworthiness" of crime laboratory
analyses). As I explain in Part III, reliance on forensic testing is unwarranted. The potential for
erroneous or fraudulent forensic reports underscores the serious threat these statutes pose to
defendants' confrontation and due process rights.
16. See, e.g., State v. Cunningham, 903 So.2d 1110, 1120 (2005) (discussing high volume of
Orleans Parish drug cases and analogizing to other jurisdictions in which fewer than 10% of
litigants challenge the State's forensic evidence); Hancock, 825 P.2d at 651 (explaining that
Oregon enacted its statute, in part, because defendants rarely challenge forensic analyses).
17. See, e.g., Cunningham, 903 So.2d at 1115-16 (explaining that the criminalist statute
relieves litigants of "the burden" of calling forensic witnesses to the stand); Rice v. State, 597
A.2d 1001, 1005 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (describing Maryland's criminalist statute as an
"evidentiary shortcut" that will "accelerate the trial of cases" (citing Thompson v. State, 566 A.2d
126 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989))); Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 74, 76 (Ga. 1996) (stating the
statute's purpose as "promot[ing] judicial economy"). For a discussion of the forensic proof ipse
dixit phenomenon in Montana, see Nicholas J. Weilhammer, Face to Face: The Crime Lab
Exception of Rule 803(8) of the Montana Rules of Evidence and the Montana Confrontation
Clause, 60 MONT. L. REV. 167, 173-99 (1999).
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forensic testimony. Nevertheless, state legislatures continue to
authorize constitutional cheating in order to reduce the costs of
adversarial criminal litigation.
18
The forensic ipse dixit statutes share more than a common goal
of quicker and cheaper criminal convictions; they also share common
cheating tactics. They create "default waivers" of fundamental
constitutional rights. In turn, those "waivers" convert the State's
partisan allegations into incontrovertible and unconstitutional
presumptions.
A. The Forensic Ipse Dixit Procedures
There are four common varieties of ipse dixit statutes. This
Article characterizes them as "notice and demand," "notice and
demand-plus," "anticipatory demand," and "defense subpoena"
procedures. 19
The most "benign" of these statutory procedures are "notice and
demand" procedures. 20 First, the State gives "notice" of its intent to
rely upon a forensic certificate to prove the chain of custody and the
18. For example, as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 5-8, even as Texas closed
several of its crime laboratories for gross scientific failures, the state legislature enacted a law
that made government forensic analysis certificates admissible, without cross-examination, "to
establish the results of a laboratory analysis ... conducted by or for a law enforcement
agency...." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 38.41 (Vernon 2006).
19. As discussed infra, state statutes may fall into more than one category; or, a state may
distinguish between different types or degrees of crime. For example, Nevada's code establishes a
notice-and-demand framework in felony DUI cases and a notice-and-demand-plus framework in
other DUI cases. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315; 50.320; 50.325 (2006). Accordingly, a felony
defendant can elicit courtroom testimony from the analyst merely by filing a written objection to
the certificate's introduction. Id. § 50.315(7). On the other hand, a misdemeanor defendant must
establish, to the satisfaction of the court, a "bona fide dispute regarding the facts in the affidavit
or declaration ... [and that] it is in the best interests of justice that the witness who signed the
affidavit or declaration be cross examined." Id. § 50.315(6).
20. Professor Paul Giannelli appears to have been the first to describe the forensic ipse dixit
statutes as "notice and demand" procedures. See Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the
Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 45, 84 (1993). In that article, Professor Giannelli
encouraged states to adopt notice and demand statutes that would "ease the government's
burden" of producing forensic witnesses, while "protecting the defendants' right of confrontation."
Id. at 84. Like most criminal procedure scholars, I am indebted to Professor Giannelli for his
path-breaking work on scientific evidence and criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli,
Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right To Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1319-20 (2004); Paul C. Giannelli, The "Science" of Wrongful Convictions,
18 CRIM. JUST. 55 (2003); Paul C. Giannelli, Admissibility of Lab Reports: the Right of
Confrontation Post-Crawford, 19 CRIM. JUST. 26 (2004); P.C. GIANNELLI & E.J. IMWINKELRIED,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1999). However, for all of the reasons set forth in this Article, I
respectfully disagree with Professor Giannelli's conclusion that notice and demand statutes
adequately protect a defendant's confrontation rights. See infra Part IV.
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crime laboratory's forensic conclusions.21 To prevent the admission of
the forensic hearsay and invocation of the applicable presumptions,
the defendant must timely object and "demand" that the prosecution
produce the forensic witness at trial. The demand must meet relevant
procedural statutory requirements including timely and proper
service. 22  However, the demand need not include substantive
allegations or specific fact-based objections. Failure to file a demand
constitutes waiver of the defendant's objection to the hearsay and to
its statutory consequences. Generally, this means that the forensic
report proves both the chain of custody and the substantive
conclusions of the forensic report. Twelve states rely on this notice
and demand procedure.
23
"Notice and demand-plus" statutes mimic the structure of
notice and demand statutes but impose substantive requirements on
the defendant's demand. 24 Once the prosecution provides the requisite
notice, the defense must file a substantive objection with factual
allegations that justify its demand that the prosecution produce its
witness.25 Alaska requires that a defendant "show [] cause" for
21. Proper notice typically requires that the prosecution timely provide the defense with a
copy of the report and a statement of the prosecution's intent to invoke the applicable statutory
presumptions. Timely notice ranges from a mandatory forty days before trial, see, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 12-21-301 (2006) (notice must be provided "not less than 40 days prior to the commencement of
the hearing or trial"), to an ambiguous requirement that the State provide notice "before trial,"
see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(B) (West 2006) (State must give notice "prior to" trial).
See also State ex rel. T.J., 800 So. 2d 969 (La.Ct. App. 2001) (declining to determine whether
notice given the morning of trial qualifies as a "reasonable time" before trial).
22. The demand must typically be filed within a specified time after the receipt of notice or
before the commencement of trial. Demand dates vary from state to state. Compare ALA. CODE §
12-21-302(a) (2006) (requiring the defendant to issue demand at least 30 days prior to trial) and
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4332(a) (2006) (requiring the demand be issued at least five days prior
to trial).
23. The twelve states are as follows: Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4330-4332 (2006);
Illinois, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-15 (West 2000) (but see People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d
470 (Ill. 2000), holding statute unconstitutional); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006); Maryland;
MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-914 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§§ 10-1001 to -1003 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-306 (West 2006);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2167 (2006); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320,
50.325 (2004) (Note that § 50.315 has separate provisions for misdemeanor and felony DUI cases,
and that a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision held that the statute violates the defendant's
confrontation right, see City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 595 (Nev. 2004)); Ohio, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 22, § 751.1 (West 2006);
Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (Vernon 2006); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-
187 to -187.2 (West 2006); Washington, WASH. ST. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.13 (2006).
24. It might be more accurate to characterize the "demand" as a written objection.
However, since "demand" is the term consistently used in relevant statutes and scholarly
literature, I use that term throughout this Article.
25. The substantive demand requirements often require the defendant to reveal part of his
defense strategy in exchange for the opportunity to have the court consider permitting him to
confront the State's forensic witness.
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wanting to confront the witness. 26 Tennessee requires a defendant to
support his demand with proof that he has a good faith basis for
challenging the prosecution's forensic conclusions. 27 Alabama and
Louisiana require that defense counsel affirm, under oath, that she
intends to cross-examine the witness at trial.28 These statutes are not
self-executing; a proper pleading of the requisite allegation does not,
in itself, compel the prosecution to produce its witness. Instead, the
trial court reviews the defense's demand to determine whether its
pleading justifies an order to produce the prosecution's witness for
cross-examination.
29
In "anticipatory demand" schemes, the prosecution has no
notice obligation. The prosecution need never notify the defense or the
court that it plans to rely on the hearsay forensic report in lieu of live
testimony.30 Still, a defendant must make a timely pretrial demand
that the prosecution produce its witness; otherwise, the defendant is
deemed to have waived any objection to the forensic ipse dixit
procedure. 31 In this trial-by-ambush, 32 defense counsel must blindly,
26. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (LexisNexis 2006).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-311 (2006).
28. ALA. CODE § 12-21-302 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:501 (2006). The "good faith"
demand statutes create an ethical dilemma for defense counsel. Before seeing the State present
its trial case, she must affirm, under oath, that if the forensic witness appears, she will cross-
examine. This creates a serious conflict of interest between lawyer and client. If, after seeing the
State's direct evidence, she decides that the defendant is best-served by waiving cross-
examination on the forensic evidence she faces professional sanctions. ALA. CODE § 12-21-302;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:501. However, if she protects her own interests at the cost of the
defendant's most effective trial strategy, she commits the most serious of ethical violations.
29. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-302 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:501 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:35-19(c) (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315; 50.320; 50.325 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-35-311(c)(2) (2006).
30. Fewer than half of the forensic ipse dixit statutes require that the prosecution give the
defense formal pretrial notice of its intent to rely on the forensic report in lieu of live witness
testimony. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-313 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4330-4332
(2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.1934, 327.354 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2745 (2006);
IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2902a (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010
(West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2431
(2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2006); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90B, § 8 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C,
§ 47A (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a (2006); MINN. STAT. §§ 634.15-.16 (2006); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 577.037 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320
(2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 215-A:11-i, 265:92-a, 270:57 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-110,
66-13-11 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney 2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518,
4520 (McKinney 2006); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30 (McKinney 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-
03.1-37, 39-20-07 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.235 (2006); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (West
2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-3-19 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-407, 40-35-311, 40-28-122
(2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6a-515, 72-10-503 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1203
(2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4816 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-268.7, 18.2-268.9, 19.2-187,
19.2-187.01, 19.2-187.02, 19.2-187.2 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (2006).
31. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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but timely, make pretrial objections to an unseen forensic report
without knowing whether the prosecution intends to rely upon that
report.
33
Moreover, some of these anticipatory demand statutes are
actually anticipatory demand-plus statutes. The defense's objection
must meet a substantive threshold. The trial court considers the
substance of the defense demand to determine whether the demand
justifies the time and expense associated with confrontation of the
State's witness.
Finally, in "defense subpoena" procedures, any forensic
prosecution witness appears as a result of a defense subpoena and
testifies on the defense's case. Some ipse dixit legislation prescribes a
defense subpoena as the statutory procedure for objection and
demand.34 In the absence of any statutory procedure that entitles the
defendant to subpoena the State's witness, the defense must subpoena
the State's forensic analyst to appear on the defense's case-in-chief.
Thus, to exercise his confrontation rights, the defendant must relinquish
his right to rely on the government's failure of proof and exercise,
instead, his right to compulsory process. Most defense subpoena
procedures include a substantive demand requirement that empowers
the trial court to refuse a defense request to subpoena the forensic
witness. 35
32. The defendant's proper invocation of discovery rules may alleviate the "ambush" effect.
Most states require that, upon request, the prosecution disclose to the defense any expert
statements or reports that it plans to introduce at trial. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3212(a)
(2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.235(1) (2006); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2006);
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.815 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-13-4 (2006); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1;
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.22; IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(b)(5); KY R. CRIM. P. 7.24; ME. R. CRIM. P 16(b)(1);
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A); MICH. CT. R. 6.201(A)(5); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01; MO. R. CRIM. P.
25.03(A); R. SUPER. CT. ST. N.H. 98(A)(2); N.M. R. ANN. 5-501; N.D. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D); PA. R.
CRIM. P. 573(B)(1)(e); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 16; VT. R. CRIM. P. 16; VA. R. CT. 3A:11(b)(1)(ii); W.V. R.
CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
33. These jurisdictions include Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, and North Carolina. See, e.g.,
Dodson v. State, 934 SW.2d 198, 203 (Ark. 1996). What constitutes a "timely" pretrial objection
is generally calculated from the trial date.
34. These jurisdictions include Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho,
Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, and Rhode Island. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-905.06 (2006);
MONT. REV. 803(6), (8) (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-43 (2006). These laws are so far removed
from the ordinary presumptions of constitutional procedure that they "grant" to the defendant,
as a privilege, his unambiguous right to compulsory process. For example, Idaho's forensic report
statute authorizes the defendant to subpoena the report's author at no cost to the defendant.
IDAHO CODE. ANN. § 37-2745(d) (2006).
35. For example, Alabama's forensic certificate statute states, "The court shall grant the
request for subpoena only for good cause shown. Good cause shall not include a challenge to the
findings contained in the certificate of analysis, unless the requesting party first establishes a
legitimate basis for the challenge." ALA. CODE § 12-21-302(b) (2006); see also NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 50.315 (2006). These restrictions upon this issuance of a defense subpoena are flagrant
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B. The Reports Covered by the Ipse Dixit Procedure
Forensic ipse dixit statutes may regulate a wide range of rules
and conduct relating to laboratory procedures, laboratory personnel,
and laboratory reports. Some statutes impose minimum accreditation
requirements upon laboratory workers. Others address the question
of whether the forensic declarant must be the person who actually
conducted the forensic evaluation. Other ipse dixit statutes specify
the information that must be included in the laboratory report, such
as the laboratory's testing methodology, the tester's experience, and
the laboratory's accreditation.
The average forensic ipse dixit report contains little more than
the crime laboratory's conclusions. The vast majority of forensic ipse
dixit statutes permit the State to file a forensic certificate without any
mention of the analyst's education, qualifications, and experience.
36
In a demand-plus procedure, this effectively preempts any defense
violations of a defendant's right to compulsory process. For an excellent overview of the right
granted by the Compulsory Process Clause, see Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost
Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275 (2002).
36. The following states require that the forensic certificate provide the'tester's results but
not the tester's qualifications: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 12-21-300 (2006); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 36-254 (LexisNexis 2006); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2006); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 21a-283(b) (2006); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4330-4332 (2006); the
District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-905.06 (LexisNexis 2006); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
316.1934, 327.354 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2745 (2006); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 691.2
(2006); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (West 2006); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:499-501, 32:662-663 (2006); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2006), MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
90B, § 8 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47A (2006); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
257.625a, 600.2167 (2006); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320, 50.325 (2006); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 215-A:11-i,
265:92-a, 270:57 (2006); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-110, 66-13-11 (LexisNexis 2006);
New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney 2006), N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518, 4520 (McKinney
2006), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30 (McKinney 2006); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-
95(g), 20-139.1 (2006); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-37, 39-20-07 (2006);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 751, 751.1 (West 2006), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754
(West 2006); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.235, 40.460, 40.510 (2006); Pennsylvania, 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (West 2006); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-43 (2006); Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1203 (2006), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4816 (2006); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-268.7, 18.2-268.9, 19.2-187, 19.2-187.01, 19.2.187.02, 19.2-187.2 (2006);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (2006); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1
(2006); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 970.03 (2006); Washington Court Rules, WASH. ST. SUPER. CT.
CRIM. R. 6.13 (2006), WASH. ST. CRIM. R. CTS. LIM. JUR. 6.13 (2006). Several other states' statutes
are silent as to whether the certificate must contain the tester's qualifications. States also
impose different substantive requirements for different procedural stages and different types of
forensic testing. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2902a, 22-3437 (2006) (noting that the
certificate is admissible at a pretrial hearing even if it does not disclose analyst qualifications or
methodology; however, the certificate is admissible at trial only if it includes analyst
qualifications and methodology).
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demand based on concerns about the tester's qualification to perform
and interpret the tests at issue. Eleven states impose minimum
qualification standards on forensic testers but do not require that the
forensic report allege that the attesting examiner met the state
qualification requirements.3 7 Only thirteen states require that the
forensic report include certified information about the analyst's
education, employment history, and testing experience. 38 In sum, the
vast majority of the forensic ipse dixit statutes presume the tester's
competence.
39
Moreover, although forensic ipse dixit reports substitute for
sworn trial testimony, many of these reports are not made under oath.
Some jurisdictions permit the State to rely upon an unsworn report
that is "certified" as an authentic copy of the analyst's unsworn
report. 40 Fourteen jurisdictions have forensic ipse dixit statutes that
37. Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (LexisNexis 2006); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 4330-4332 (2006); Illinois, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-15 (West 2000) (but see People v.
McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 478 (Ill. 2000), holding the statute unconstitutional); Iowa, IOWA
CODE § 691.2 (2004); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:499-501, 32:662-663 (West 2006);
Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-914, -1001 to -1003 (West 2006); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 90-95(g), 20-139.1 (2006); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.235, 40.460,
40.510 (2006); Pennsylvania, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (West 2006); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1203 (2006), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4816 (2006); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.2-268.7, 18.2-268.9, 19.2-187, 19.2-187.01, 19.2-187.02, 19.2-187.2 (2006).
38. Examples include: Florida, §§ 10-914, -1001 to -1003 (West 2006); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. §§ 634.15-16 (2006); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 577.020, 577.037 (2006); Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320, 50.325 (2006); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-19 (West 2006);
Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-407,
40-35-311, 40-28-122 (2006); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (Vernon 2006);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (2006).
39. See generally Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34
SETON HALL L. REV. 105, 116 (2003). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-254 (LexisNexis 2006); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-707, 12-12-313 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2006); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 48-905.06 (LexisNexis 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2745 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2902a,
22-3437 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:499-501,
32:662-663 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 9057 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 205 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2431
(2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2006); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90B, § 8 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C,
§ 47A (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625a, 600.2167 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320, 50.325 (2006); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 215-A:11-i, 265:92-a,
270:57 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-110, 66-13-11 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1195 (McKinney 2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518, 4520 (McKinney 2006); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 190.30 (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-95(g), 20-139.1 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-
03.1-37, 39-20-07 (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 751, 751.1 (West 2006), OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 754 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-43 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23-3-19, 1-49-
6 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6a-515, 72-10-503 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-268.7, 18.2-
268.9, 19.2-187, 19.2-187.01, 19.2-187.02, 19.2-187.2 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (2006); WIS.
STAT. § 970.03 (2006).
40. Thus the document is certified, but no one has sworn to the accuracy or truth of its
contents. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-283(b) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4330-32
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permit the prosecution to rely on forensic certificates that are
unsigned, unsworn, or uncertified.
41
Many of these reports are prepared and signed by a laboratory
employee who never tested the substance. Only twelve jurisdictions
require that the person who conducted the scientific analysis attest to
the forensic report. 42  Other jurisdictions admit reports that are
certified by any authorized laboratory employee, regardless of the
certifying employee's familiarity with the particular test or the
general testing procedure.
43
Finally, many statutes authorize reliance on forensic ipse dixit
procedures without requiring the State to reveal the methods and
procedures underlying the analyst's forensic conclusion. 44  These
(2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-905.06 (LexisNexis 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:499-501,
32:662-63 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625a, 600.2167 (2006); MINN. STAT. §§ 634.15-16
(2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 751, 751.1
(West 2006), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23-3-19, 1-49-6
(2006). Virginia provides for the admission of forensic certificates that are not sworn, but are
"signed," "attested to," "certified," or "authenticated" by the analyst. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-
268.7, 18.2-268.9, 19.2-187, 19.2-187.01, 19.2-187.02, 19.2-187.2 (2006). Indiana and Illinois
allow the admission of notarized copies of forensic reports.
41. These jurisdictions include: Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2006); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.1934, 327.354 (West 2006); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006); Kentucky,
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (West 2006); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 577.020, 577.037
(2006); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320,
50.325 (2006); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 215-A:11-i, 265:92-a, 270:57 (2006);
New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-110, 66-13-11 (LexisNexis 2006); New York, N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney 2006), N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518, 4520 (McKinney 2006), N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 190.30 (McKinney 2006); Pennsylvania, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (West
2006); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6a-515, 72-10-503 (2006); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§§ 1202, 1203 (2006), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4816 (2006).
42. Examples of these jurisdictions include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 12-21-300 (2006);
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (Michie 2006); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2902a, 22-3437
(2006); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112 (2006), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9057
(2006), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 205 (2006), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2431 (2006);
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2006),
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90B, § 8 (2006), MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 94C, § 47A (2006); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-19 (West 2006); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-95(g), 20-139.1 (2006); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-43
(2006); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-407, 40-35-311, 40-28-122 (2006); Texas, TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (Vernon 2006); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308
(2006); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (2006). For a general discussion of the difference
between examining a proponent of the report and the forensic examiner(s) who conducted the
tests and made the forensic conclusions, see Giannelli, supra note 20, at 55-59.
43. This type of rule is in place in Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-707 (2006), North
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-37, 39-20-07 (2006), Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.235,
40.460, 40.510 (2006), and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 970.03 (2006). Oregon's statute offers the
State the alternative of having the report certified by either the analyst who performed the test
or by the director of the state police forensic laboratory.
44. Examples include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 12-21-300 (2006); Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.45.084 (2006); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-254 (2006); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN.
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"naked" reports do not indicate whether the declarant relied solely on
outcomes of scientific tests actually performed, or whether he
considered information supplied by the police or by other sources. 45
Few states impose forensic standards that regulate laboratory
testing procedures. 46 Only sixteen states require that the forensic
§ 5-64-707 (2006), ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-313 (2006); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5)
(2006); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-283(b) (2006); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 4330-4332 (2006); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-905.06 (LexisNexis 2006);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.1934, 327.354 (West 2006); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2745
(2006); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2902a, 22-3437 (2006);
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (West 2006); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:499-15:501, 32:662 -32:663 (2006); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112 (2006), ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9057 (2006), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 205 (2006), ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2431 (2006); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 111 § 13 (2006), MASS. GEN
LAWS ch. 90 § 24 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90B,
§ 8 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47A (2006); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625a,
600.2167 (2006); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 634.15-16 (2006); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 577.020, 577.037 (2006); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320, 50.325 (2006); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. Ann. §§ 66-8-110, 66-13-11
(LexisNexis 2006); New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney 2006), N.Y. C.P.L.R.
4518, 4520 (McKinney 2006), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30 (McKinney 2006); North Carolina,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-95(g), 20-139.1 (2006); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-37, 39-
20-07 (2006); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 751, 751.1 (West 2006), OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 754 (West 2006); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.235, 40.460, 40.510 (2006);
Pennsylvania, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (West 2006); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-
43 (2006); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23-3-19, 1-49-6 (2006); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1203 (2006), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4816 (2006); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.2-268.7, 18.2-268.9, 19.2-187, 19.2-187.01, 19.2-187.02, 19.2-187.2 (2006); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (2006); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (2006); Wisconsin,
Wis. STAT. § 970.03 (2006).
45. For a discussion of confirmatory bias that accompanies forensic outcomes obtained with
knowledge of extrinsic facts, see infra Part III and text accompanying notes 86-100.
46. The following jurisdictions have no forensic standards that regulate laboratory
procedures: Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-254 (2006); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-
707 (2006), ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-313 (2006); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2006);
District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-905.06 (LexisNexis 2006); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 37-2745 (2006); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2902a, 22-3437
(2006); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (West 2006); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:499-15:501, 32:662 -32:663 (2006); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 111 § 13 (2006),
MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 90 § 24 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (2006), MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 90B, § 8 (2006), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47A (2006); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 257.625a, 600.2167 (2006); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320, 50.325 (2006); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 215-A:11-i,
265:92-a, 270:57 (2006); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-19 (West 2006); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-110, 66-13-11 (LexisNexis 2006); New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195
(McKinney 2006), N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518, 4520 (McKinney 2006), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30
(McKinney 2006); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-95(g), 20-139.1 (2006); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-37, 39-20-07 (2006); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 751,
751.1 (West 2006), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754 (West 2006); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
19-43 (2006); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6a-515, 72-10-503 (2006); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.2-268.7, 18.2-268.9, 19.2-187, 19.2-187.01, 19.2-187.02, 19.2-187.2 (2006); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (2006); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (2006); Wisconsin,
WIS. STAT. § 970.03 (2006).
488
2006] CHEATING THE CONSTITUTION 489
report disclose the forensic methodology that the laboratory used. 47
Eleven states prescribe the testing methodology but do not require
that the report include any affirmation that the laboratory actually
used that methodology.
48
Thus, most forensic ipse dixit statutes virtually eliminate
judicial inquiry into the reliability of the general scientific
methodology or the particular scientific test.49 Only five jurisdictions
impose a "trifecta" of stringent requirements upon the forensic
certificates: disclosure of the analyst's qualifications and experience;
identification of the applicable testing methodology; and verification of
the report, made by the forensic examiner, under oath and subject to
the penalty of perjury. 50 The remainders of the forensic ipse dixit
statutes tread heavily on the toes of a defendant's due process right to
have the jury hear only reliable expert testimony.
47. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 12-21-300 (2006); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-283(b)
(2006); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.1934, 327.354 (West 2006); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-2902a, 22-3437 (2006); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:499-15:501, 32:662 -32:663
(2006); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 205 (2006); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. §§ 10-914, -1001 to -1003 (West 2006); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 634.15-16 (2006);
Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 577.020, 577.037 (2006); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320,
50.325 (2006); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-19 (West 2006); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2925.51 (West 2006); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 23-3-19, 1-49-6 (2006); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-311, 40-28-122 (2006); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41
(Vernon 2004); South Carolina, S.C. R. CRIM. PRO. 6 (2006).
48. Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (2006); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4330-
4332 (2006); Illinois, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-15 (West 2000) (but see People v.
McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 478 (Ill. 2000), holding the statute unconstitutional); Louisiana,
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:499-15:501, 32:662 -32:663 (2006); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. §§ 10-914, -1001 to -1003 (West 2006); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-95(g),
20-139.1 (2006); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-37, 39-20-07 (2006); Oregon, OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 475.235, 40.460, 40.510 (2006); Pennsylvania, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547
(West 2006); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1203 (2006), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4816
(2006); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-268.7, 18.2-268.9, 19.2-187, 19.2-187.01, 19.2-187.02,
19.2-187.2 (2006). When the forensic report states the tester's conclusions, but does not provide
the underlying data, a rigorous scientific approach would presume the incompetence of the
results. As one commentator has explained: "For a report from a crime laboratory to be deemed
competent, I think most scientists would require it to contain a minimum of three elements: (a) a
description of the analytical techniques used in the test requested by the government or other
party, (b) the quantitative or qualitative results with any appropriate qualifications concerning
the degree of certainty surrounding them, and (c) an explanation of any necessary presumptions
or inferences that were needed to reach the conclusions." Symposium on Science and the Rules of
Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 632 (William A. Thomas ed., 1984).
49. This is true under both the Daubert test, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and the Frye test, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (1923). Whether legislatures can require judges and juries to make specific factual
findings is a subject that has been, and will continue to be, debated by scholars. Full exploration
of this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
50. Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2902a, 22-3437 (2006); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
6, § 205 (2006); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-19 (West 2006); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (Vernon 2006); and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-311, 40-28-122
(2006).
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In many states, admission of hearsay forensic reports has
become the prosecution's primary means of establishing forensic proof.
Twenty-three states make a forensic report de jure or de facto, prima
facie evidence of its contents.5 1
Finally, legislatures add a wide variety of incentives to
discourage anyone from actually haling a state forensic examiner into
court. Some incentives sweeten the pot for prosecutors by affecting
trial-outcome. For example, in a controlled substance case, forensic
proof is an element of the charged crime. Reliance on a forensic
certificate rewards the State with a prima facie presumption that the
prosecution has proven the truth of the report. This relieves the
prosecution of its burden of proving this essential 'substance'
element. 52  Thus, these statutes actively reward the cheating
prosecutor. In contrast, if the prosecutor plays by the con3titutional
rules and introduces live witness testimony, the presumption
evaporates.
Other state practices reward defendants who let the cheaters
slide by and punish defendants who enforce the constitutional rules.
Some state statutes impose formal sanctions on defendants who
exercise their constitutional rights. In Alabama, 53 Alaska,54 the
51. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (Michie 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-254 (LexisNexis
2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-707 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-283(b) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 4330-32 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.1934, 327.354 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE. ANN.
§ 37-2745(e) (2006); IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:500 (2006); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9057 (2006) (prima facie proof that the test was done correctly); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-914, -1002 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 111, § 13 (2006);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, §§ 39, 41 (2006); MINN. STAT.
§ 634.16 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518, 4520 (McKinney 2006);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2925.51 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.235 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-3-19 (2006); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1203 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (2006); WASH. ST. SUPER. CT.
CRIM. R. 6.13 (2006); WASH. ST. CRIM. R. CTS. LiM. JUR. 6.13 (2006).
52. For example, Delaware's Controlled Substance Act criminalizes the knowing or
intentional possession, use or consumption of a controlled substance. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 4753 (2006). A forensic certificate of analysis offered under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4330
establishes prima facie proof that the forensic conclusion is true. However, if the forensic
examiner testifies, the report is no longer prima facie evidence of its contents. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 4332(1), (2) (2006). While this is sensible from the perspective of traditional
evidentiary law prohibiting a party from bolstering its own witness's testimony, it also creates an
institutional prosecutorial preference for the use of a certificate in lieu of a live witness. See also
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:501(B)(1) (2006) (noting that when the forensic examiner testifies, "the
certificate shall not be prima facie proof of its contents or of proper custody").
53. ALA. CODE §§ 12-21-300 to -302 (2006) ("If the request for subpoena is granted, and the
requesting party subsequently fails to conduct the cross-examination previously certified to, the
court shall assess against the requesting party, all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred
for the attendance in court of the certifying witness.").
54. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084 (LexisNexis 2006).
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District of Columbia, 55 Louisiana, 56 Montana, 57 New Jersey,58 North
Dakota, 59 Rhode Island,60 and Tennessee,61 a defendant who requires
the government to produce the forensic witness but, at trial, waives
cross-examination, pays the costs associated with the witness's
appearance.
62
Informally, defendants who insist on confronting the forensic
witness may experience an extra "trial penalty," in excess of whatever
sentencing increase typically is imposed upon the defendant who goes
to trial. After all, these statutes promote a normative expectation
that, even in those few cases that proceed to trial, judges need not
spend their time listening to, and ruling on, evidence about forensic
testing. Thus, defendants who go to trial and challenge forensic
analyses receive not only the usual trial penalty informally imposed
on "difficult" defendants, but also an additional sentencing bump
imposed by an impatient judge who cannot understand why the
defendant insisted on challenging the forensic conclusions when
''everyone knows these tests are reliable."
III. CHALLENGING THE MYTH OF RELIABILITY
The legal community now concedes, with varying degrees of
urgency, that our system produces erroneous convictions based on
discredited forensics. 63 The renowned Innocence Project of Cardozo
Law School has demonstrated that forensic fraud, forensic error, and
"bad science" were significant factors in the first seventy wrongful
55. D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-905.06 (LexisNexis 2006).
56. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:499-501 (2006).
57. MT. ST. REV. 803(6), (8) (2006).
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-19 (West 2006).
59. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 19-03.1-37 (2006).
60. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-43 (2006).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-311 (2006).
62. As discussed supra in note 28, these statutes may also create a conflict of interest
between defendants and their counsel.
63. See, e.g., EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 33-76 (1996) (discussing the first 28 DNA exonerations); Craig M.
Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 381, 387-408 (2004) ("[T]he forensic science community is having difficulty
establishing its competence and proficiency."); Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y &
L. 439, 441-69 (1997) ("[Mlajor abuses in the use of scientific evidence have surfaced, including
perjury by expert witnesses, faked laboratory reports, and testimony based on unproven
techniques."); Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2006) ("a
non-profit legal clinic and criminal justice resource center ... [which] work[s] to exonerate the
wrongfully convicted through post-conviction DNA testing').
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convictions that were reversed when the Innocence Project used DNA
to exonerate those innocent persons.
64
Possible sources of error abound. The scientific methodology
may be unsound. The testing equipment may malfunction. The
testing specimen may be contaminated, either deliberately or
inadvertently. The chain of custody may be broken, so that
substances are linked to the wrong defendants. The tester may err in
conducting the forensic examination or in interpreting the test results.
Clerical errors may occur in the transcription and recording of forensic
test results, and tester dishonesty may produce deliberate
misrepresentation of test results. Yet, the purported reliability of
state forensic testing has long been used as a justification for the
forensic ipse dixit legislation.
6 5
Two core assumptions lead legislatures and courts to treat
state forensic laboratory evidence as reliable. Others have written
eloquently and with great scientific precision about the vices of these
assumptions as applied to specific types of forensic testing.6 6 However,
64. See Innocence Project, About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org
(last visited Jan. 26, 2006) (discussing the use of DNA to exonerate innocent persons); see also
CONNORS, supra note 63, at 33-76 (discussing the first 28 DNA exonerations); JIM DWYER ET AL.,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED 244-52 (2000) ("Forensic scientists shade their conclusions or skip the tests
altogether, to accommodate a presumption of guilt.").
65. See, e.g., Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 142 (5th Cir. 1995) ("cross-examination of the
chemists who prepared the report would have been of little use"); Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311,
1314-15 (10th Cir. 1994) (asserting that the laboratory notes were trustworthy because, inter
alia, they "concern mechanically objective tests," "were taken contemporaneously with the
performance of the tests," and the chemist appeared to have followed standard laboratory
procedures); United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1360 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1069 (1989); Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39 (2d. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1020 (1987)
(asserting that laboratory reports were sufficiently reliable to obviate need for cross-examination
where the chemists analyzed thousands of compounds each year); Brown v. United States, 627
A.2d 499, 507 (D.C. 1993) (deeming the state-generated laboratory report "inherently reliable");
see also State v. Hudson, No. 79010, 2002 WL 472304, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2002) ("The
trustworthiness of such analyses has long been recognized by the courts."); State v. Hancock, 825
P.2d 648, 651 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (referring to legislative findings that "representatives from the
Oregon State Police and the Oregon District Attorneys' Association testified that they could not
recall any cases of drugs being misidentified by laboratory analysis," and that "the accuracy of
the chemical analysis of an alleged controlled substance by the laboratory is almost never
challenged"); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839 (D.C. 1984) ("[T]he fact sought to be
established through admission of the DEA [chemist] reports, is determined by a well recognized
chemical procedure. Thus, the reports contained objective facts rather than expressions of
opinion."). But see Hudson, 2002 WL 472304, at *10 (Karpinski, J., dissenting) ("This last year,
newspapers have reported instances across the nation of technicians falsifying chemical lab
reports. How trustworthy is a report if the person who prepared it has [not] ... testified under
oath at a trial? A major test of reliability is that oath.").
66. See, e.g., Alfred Biasotti & John Murdock, The Scientific Basis of Firearms and
Toolmark Identification: Areas of Scientific Disagreement, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 29-2.3 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002); C.
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in order to contextualize the concept of constitutional cheating, this
Article briefly discusses why these assumptions are unwarranted.
Common human experiences remind us that "science" changes
with human progress. Scientific analyses are not static and neither
are the substances, both legal and illegal, that laboratories are asked
to test. For example, during the 1970s and 1980s the standard forensic
tests for determining the identity of a controlled substance were the
"color test" and the "crystal test". Both were routinely used by
forensic analysts, and the forensic results were routinely cited as proof
that a tested specimen contained a controlled substance. As drug
testing science evolved, however, it became clear that the color and
crystal tests produced an unacceptably high number of false
positives.
67
State forensic examiners then turned to thin layer and gas
liquid chromatography. 68  However, these methods also proved
undesirable and are now considered unacceptably prone to operator
error in both test performance and data interpretation.6 9 In early
2005, infrared and mass spectrometry are the favored diagnostic
methods among knowledgeable analysts.70  Even spectrometry,
however, can be unreliable as street drug technology outstrips
laboratory testing knowledge and legislative prohibitions. When used
to analyze street drugs on the street market, the spectrometry
methodology can only identify those drugs that are 90 to 95 percent
pure.7 1 Since most street drugs are cut with substances that increase
Michael Bowers, Identification from Bitemarks: Proficiency Testing of Board Certified
Odontologists, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
§ 30-2.1.3 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002); Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie?:
Reweighing Fingerprint Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 37-48 (2003);
Richard Lempert, After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRC II, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 439, 465-68
(1997) ("DNA evidence is routinely evaluated and presented in court in ways that risk
substantially overstating its incriminating power."); Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific
Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
1167, 1170-86 (2003).
67. Some laboratories produced false positives in as many as 20 to 30 percent of the color
and crystal tests they performed. PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 2 SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 23-2(B), at 355 (3d ed. 1999).
68. See James M. Shellow, The End of a Confidence Game: A Possible Defense to the
Impossible Drug Prosecution, THE CHAMPION, Aug./Sept. 2000, at 22, 23. For an explanation of
this testing methodology and an assessment of its associated error rate, see 2 DAVID BERNHEIM,
DEFENSE OF NARCOTICS CASES § 4.08 (2001).
69. BERNHEIM, supra note 68, § 4.08[4]-[5].
70. Shellow, supra note 68, at 23-24. For a detailed explanation of these testing processes,
see BERNHEIM, supra note 68, § 4.13.
71. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 67, § 23-3(A), at 390.
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the drug's volume and decrease the drug's purity, this poses a
significant and ongoing obstacle to accurate forensic identification.
7 2
Moreover, laboratory error and operator error exist even with
the most well-established or unassailable scientific method. 73 Many
courts naively assume that laboratory workers are professionals with
a great deal of training and little motive to falsify their reports. 74 To
the contrary, forensic accuracy is limited by "the limitations of the
technician."75 Untold numbers of laboratory workers do not have any
professional training in the science or technology that they use.
76
According to the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, of
the 400-500 laboratories conducting forensic examinations for criminal
trials, only 283 are accredited.
77
Moreover, laboratory employees who prepare forensic ipse dixit
certifications often lack the education or experience that would be
necessary for them to testify, as experts, about the scientific results
they have certified.78 If these testers cannot accurately read and
report the forensic data, their truthfulness is irrelevant. The results
72. For example, the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory has mistakenly identified anti-
ulcer medication as heroin. Shellow, supra note 68, at 22, n.6 (citing XXVIII MICROGRAM 2 (Jan.
1995)).
73. For example, in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), the Supreme Court touted
the reliability of the Intoxilyzer, stating that "[o]nce the Intoxilyzer indicate[s] that respondents
were legally drunk, breath samples [preserved for retesting by the defendants are] much more
likely to provide inculpatory than exculpatory evidence." Id. at 489. Yet the Court insisted that
"as to operator error, the defendant retains the right to cross-examine the law enforcement
officer who administered [the scientific test], and to attempt to raise doubts in the mind of the
factfinder whether the test was properly administered." Id. at 490.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 755 A.2d 1011, 1016 (D.C. 2000) (Drug Enforcement
Agency "chemists who conduct such analyses do so routinely and generally do not have an
interest in the outcome of trials. In fact, as employees and scientists, they are under a duty to
make accurate reports. It is difficult to perceive any motive or opportunity for the chemists to
falsify." (quoting Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839 (D.C. 1984)) (quotations omitted).
75. Shellow, supra note 68, at 24.
76. One commentator has noted that "[w]e suffer from a shortage of truly competent experts
and facilities and an equally important shortage of independent means to evaluate the
competency of individuals and facilities. Too many individuals who testify in court offer their
services purely as self-professed experts. [... 1 In spite of being a firm advocate of forensic
science, I must acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of laboratories are not
performing routine tests competently, as shown by our proficiency testing." Symposium on
Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, supra note 48, at 645 (quoting Professor Joseph
Peterson).
77. For a list of ASCLD accredited labs, see American Society of Crime Laboratory
Directors, Laboratory Accreditation Board,
http://www.ascld-lab.orglegacy/aslablegacylaboratories.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
78. See, e.g., Shellow, supra note 68, at 22 ("Few analysts have even a rudimentary
understanding of the scientific method."); accord David A. Stony, A Medical Model for
Criminalistics Education, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1086, 1088 (1988) ("What are the entry
requirements [to forensic science]? Employment and function. One joins the profession when one
is hired by a crime laboratory and when one begins to write reports and to testify in court.").
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are disastrous. 79 For example, in Baltimore, Maryland, 480 criminal
convictions had to be reexamined when investigators discovered that
crime laboratory chemist, Concepcion Bacasnot, "did not understand
the science of her forensic tests," and therefore produced serology
results that were sometimes "worthless. '8 0  Similarly, an audit in
Arizona showed that technicians at the Phoenix Crime Lab used
incorrect mathematical computations in calculating the likelihood that
DNA samples matched the charged defendants.8 1
No one should assume that these errors plague only some
states, or that particular laboratories or particular law enforcement
agencies produce presumptively reliable forensic results. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation often analyzes evidence that has been
gathered and stored by state crime laboratories. The accuracy of FBI
testing therefore depends, in part, upon state quality control
procedures. When the collecting laboratory contaminates samples or
fails to accurately identify and store testing samples, the subsequent
forensic inquiry lacks scientific integrity.8 2 Although recent examples
of this type of "link in the chain" forensic error abound, the most
startling have been observed in Texas. Because of gross state
laboratory failures, the FBI no longer collects database DNA samples
from forensic laboratories in Dallas, Forth Worth, or Houston.8 3
Failures to follow laboratory protocol cause other forensic
errors. Even knowledgeable laboratory workers sometimes engage in
sloppy laboratory work or cut corners on important confirmatory tests.
For example, in Florida, a routine quality assurance check caught a
laboratory technician falsifying DNA evidence rather than performing
confirmation tests.8 4  Police and prosecutors may also pressure
79. William C. Thompson, Review of DNA Evidence in State v. Josiah Sutton, SCIENTIFIC
TESTIMONY, Feb. 6, 2003, at 1-2, available at http://www.scientific.org/archive/Thompson%20
Report.PDF.
80. Stephanie Hanes, Chemist Quit Crime Lab Job After Hearing, Papers Show; She
Acknowledged Report Was 'Worthless" in 1987, BALT. SUN, Mar. 19, 2003, at lB.
81. See Carlos Miller, Phoenix Police Lab Errs on DNA: 9 Cases Under Review After
Mistakes Found, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May 6, 2003, at B1.
82. Obviously the failure to follow chain of custody procedures also renders evidence
inaccurate or irrelevant.
83. The DNA department of the Houston Crime Laboratory was shut down indefinitely in
December 2003 due to an internal audit that discovered "widespread problems with personnel,
procedures and facilities." Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, State Might Overhaul Crime Labs;
Legislators Look at Oversight Panel, Regional Facilities, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 20, 2005, at
B1. "According to the audit, lab workers were insufficiently trained, did not follow standard
scientific protocols and gave trial testimony based on questionable lab results." Armando
Villafranca, Crime Lab Probe Looks Beyond Harris County; Evidence in 14 Outside Cases Was
Tested at Houston Facility, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, April 16, 2003, at A27.
84. Rene Stutzman, State DNA Analyst's Data Forgeries Could Result in New Trial for
Rapist, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 25, 2002, Al.
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laboratory workers to produce quick results. The pressure may
discourage full compliance with laboratory protocol, leading to shoddy
performance and inaccurate results.8 5
Ignorance, error, and laziness are not the only reason that
laboratory results may lack reliability. Bias plays an important role.
Conscious or subconscious tester bias may slant the interpretation and
conclusion drawn from a forensic test. While crime laboratory
workers may be less personally invested in a case than are police
investigators, laboratory workers may nevertheless have a similar
pro-prosecution bias.8 6 After all, they are either state employees or
employees of a state contractor, working in a laboratory that exists "in
large part to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of crimes."87
When state crime laboratory workers generate forensic reports they
act "as an arm of the State in assisting it to prevail in litigation and
secure a conviction of the defendant."88  These laboratory workers
devote themselves almost exclusively to analysis of samples submitted
by law enforcement.8 9 "They inevitably become part of the effort to
bring an offender to justice" and share a "viewpoint colored brightly
with prosecutorial bias."90 Indeed, in many cases "forensic scientists
have exaggerated positive results in favor of the prosecution and
downplayed negative results."91
Forensic examiners are also keenly aware that police
investigators have hand-picked the particular samples and substances
that the police want to have tested. The forensic team is, in turn,
85. See Ruth Teichroeb, Rare Look Inside State Crime Labs Reveals Recurring Problems: 23
Cases in 3 Years Had DNA Test Errors, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 22, 2004, at Al.
According to an internal investigation launched in response to revelations of laboratory
negligence, analysts "rushed [their] work in order to satisfy police." Id. The report noted that
"[tihe quality of interpretations and data review should not be compromised under pressure from
the submitting agencies to prematurely release results." Id.
86. See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2002).
87. State v. Williams, 644 N.W. 2d 919, 931 (Wis. 2002). Many courts overlook this
institutional loyalty when they evaluate the reliability of state laboratory reports. As discussed
previously, the failure to treat laboratory workers as part of the prosecution team has led some
courts and legislatures to treat state laboratory reports like business records or public records
that are exempted from the usual hearsay rules. See supra note 65.
88. Williams, 644 N.W. 2d at 931.
89. Risinger et al., supra note 86, at 19 (quoting James E. Starrs, The Ethical Obligations of
the Forensic Scientist in the Criminal Justice System, 54 J. ASS'N OFFICIAL ANALYTICAL
CHEMISTS 906, 910 (1971)).
90. Id.
91. Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have To Do With It?: A Commentary on Wrongful
Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (citing D. Michael Risinger &
Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and Leviathan: Law Enforcement-Sponsored Research
and the Criminal Process, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1023, 1042).
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likely to rely upon a confirmation bias that inclines them to affirm the
hypothesis inherent in sample submission: the crime scene sample
matches the "target" sample. 92  Thus, "the seeds for erroneous
convictions are sown in the investigative stage."93 Convinced of their
hypothesis about guilt and the correlative forensic outcomes that
would prove a defendant's guilt, "officers and prosecutors either don't
realize the significance or accuracy of exculpatory evidence or on
occasion affirmatively conceal it because they are convinced of the
suspect's guilt."94 This phenomenon increases the likelihood that an
examiner will only observe inculpatory results. 95 When investigators
drop hints about the nature of the sample or its forensic origins, the
likelihood of an inculpatory conclusion again increases. 96  The
submission of a sample is often itself a message from the investigator
to the examiner, which may influence the conclusions of even the most
honest examiner. 97 Some laboratories even permit investigators to
communicate directly with forensic workers, informing them of the
investigator's hypothesis about the crime.98
Prosecutors also play a part in biasing forensic outcomes. A
recent study commissioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
noted that prosecutors sometimes pressure examiners to "push the
envelope" in assessing and reporting test results.99  Laboratory
92. Risinger et al., supra note 86, at 7 n.22 (citing ARTHUR S. REBER, THE PENGUIN
DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 151 (2d ed. 1995) (defining confirmation bias as "[t]he tendency to
seek and interpret information that confirms existing beliefs")).
93. Raeder, supra note 91, at 1327.
94. Id. (citing Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger, Baserates, The Presumption of Guilt,
Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1056-57). Saks
and Risinger argue for a requirement that investigators search for evidence that contradicts the
guilt hypothesis.
95. Saks & Risinger, supra note 94, at 1058.
96. Id. For a particularly egregious example of how investigator-examiner communications
affect outcomes, see Giannelli, Admissibility of Lab Reports: The Right of Confrontation Post-
Crawford, supra note 20, at 31. Professor Giannelli points to the case of Stevens v. Bordenkircher,
746 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1984), in which the state introduced an autopsy report that specified that
the cause of death was a gunshot wound. An evidentiary hearing revealed that the coroner never
conducted an autopsy and could not independently determine the cause of death. Id. at 345-46.
The autopsy "report" was based entirely upon the police investigator's statements to the
examiner to the effect that the deceased had been shot. Id.
97. For a discussion of scientific observer errors and the absence of adequate control
measures, see Risinger et al., supra note 86, at 27-56.
98. Id. at 32.
99. COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION
COMPARISON, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD
EVIDENCE 106 (2004) [hereinafter WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE]. Of course, ethical rules
prohibit this type of prosecutorial misconduct. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.3(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("A prosecutor who engages an expert for an opinion
20061 497
498 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2:475
workers respond by producing accordingly. False-positive matches are
"classic error[s] that [reflect] a bias on the part of the analyst wanting
to make a match."'100
Even the laboratory report itself may contribute to inaccurate
case outcomes. Laboratory reports are often deceptively
straightforward. This type of evidentiary simplification seems to
require "a measure of falsification."' 0'1 Nowhere is this more true than
in the simplification of scientific conclusions.
First, testing outcomes are often less straightforward than the
forensic conclusions advanced in the laboratory report. Squeezing
forensic science into a criminal trial framework encourages examiners
to reduce a complex forensic outcome into a 'yes or no' answer" to a
forensic question. 0 2 Regardless of the declarant's intent, a report that
provides forensic "outcomes" may well exaggerate forensic reliability
or conceal forensic ambiguities. 0 3 For example, in 2004, at the FBI's
request, the prestigious National Research Council reviewed the
scientific evidence used in criminal cases involving ballistics. The
report concluded that experts sometimes exaggerated the scientific
reliability and relevance of their test results. 0 4  For instance,
although "[d]etailed patterns of the distribution of ammunition are
unknown," experts often drafted laboratory reports indicating that
they had "matched" ammunition found at the crime scene to
ammunition connected to the defendant. 105
should respect the independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation of the
expert's opinion on the subject.").
100. Teichroeb, supra note 85 (quoting Janine Arvizu, the auditor in charge of the
investigation). One analyst whose work was called into question responded that she "frankly had
a brain fart." Id. Forensic scientist Denise Olson explained, "We're all human .... I tried not to
let [police bias] influence me. But I can't say it never does." Id.
101. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.4 (1986) (quoting E. MCCLEARY, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (2d ed. 1972)).
102. In cases involving forensic evidence, "probabilistic evidence is becoming increasingly
common and important at trial." Raeder, supra note 91, at 1318. Forensic ipse dixit procedures
further exacerbate this problem since the "conclusion" required by a forensic report requires the
expert to draw "a line or threshold that presumes or determines the answer" to a complex and
probabilistic factual issue. 4 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 24 (2005). Moreover, many wrongful
convictions "occur in cases where experts present forensic evidence, much of it in probabilistic
form" as is required by the nature of the science itself. Raeder, supra note 91, at 1319.
103. As a result, the NRC urged that "a further explanatory comment should accompany the
laboratory conclusions to readily portray the limitations of the evidence." WEIGHING BULLET
LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 99, at 110.
104. Id. at 7 ("[Compositional analysis of bullet lead] does not, however, have the unique
specificity of techniques such as DNA typing to be used as stand-alone evidence. It is important
that criminal justice professionals and juries understand ... the significant limitations of this
forensic technique.').
105. Id.
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Slanted reports are not the worst examples of abuses by
forensic examiners. The case of West Virginia State Trooper Fred
Zain illustrates how state crime laboratory workers can, and do,
engage in long-term, systematic, and deliberate falsification of
evidence in criminal cases. 10 6 From 1979 to 1989, Zain worked as a
forensic serologist in the West Virginia Department of Public Safety.
In 1990, Zain became the chief of physical evidence for the medical
examiner in Bexar County, Texas.
During his tenure as serologist for the West Virginia State
Police, Zain performed, and drafted reports on, over one hundred
forensic tests.10 7 He also disregarded laboratory procedures, altered
laboratory records, and deliberately misreported testing outcomes.108
Because Zain's testing results and his expert courtroom testimony
were often "scientifically inaccurate, invalid, or false," 10 9 a specially-
appointed habeas court concluded that, "as a matter of law, any
testimonial or documentary evidence offered by Zain at any time in
any criminal prosecution should be deemed invalid, unreliable, and
inadmissible."1'1 0
There is little reason to view Zain's downfall as evidence that
"the system is working" in rooting out careless, lazy, and dishonest
laboratory workers. Deficient laboratory procedures "undoubtedly
contribut[ed] to an environment in which Zain's misconduct escaped
detection." ''1 Those types of deficiencies make all forensic outcomes
fair game for adversarial inquiry.11 2  Institutional management
106. In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503-04 (W. Va.
1993). West Virginia's forensic ipse dixit statute applies only to DUI cases. One wonders whether
Zain's misconduct would have been uncovered if West Virginia had had a forensic ipse dixit
procedure for proving toxicology and serology outcomes.
107. Id. at 511.
108. Id. at 503. A report by the Laboratory Accreditation Board of the American Society of
Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD/LAB) concludes that Zain's misconduct included: "(1)
overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on individual
pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of
evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items had been tested, when only a single item had been
tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory results;
(7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that genetic markers had been obtained
from all samples tested; (8) failing to report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report
conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect
when testing supported only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible
or improbable results." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 520.
111. Id. at 504.
112. These procedural deficiencies included: "(1) no written documentation of testing
methodology; (2) no written quality assurance program; (3) no written internal or external
auditing procedures; (4) no routine proficiency testing of laboratory technicians; (5) no technical
review of work product; (6) no written documentation of instrument maintenance and
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failures, like those of Zain's supervisors, who "may have ignored or
concealed complaints of his misconduct," produce institutional
outcome failures. 113 Thus, Zain, and others like him, may represent
the tip of the forensic inaccuracy iceberg.
IV. CONFRONTATION
The forensic ipse dixit statutes swindle defendants out of the
Confrontation Clause's "bedrock procedural guarantee."'114  As
discussed supra, for nearly thirty years, state legislatures have
routinely stacked the deck, dealing the state a hand that virtually
guarantees the admission of untested forensic reports. The
justification has been reliability; the goal has been systemic economy.
Despite the prosecution of thousands upon thousands of cases in
which the state has had the advantage of presenting forensic hearsay,
few defendants have successfully challenged the deprivation of the
confrontation right.
Crawford v. Washington may have forced courts to reexamine
this constitutional legerdemain. After all, confrontation is "an
essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which
is this country's constitutional goal." 115  But, even as some courts
strike down forensic ipse dixit statutes, legislatures and prosecutors
promote new versions of the constitutional con game."16
This Part reviews the central premise of the Supreme Court's
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the analysis that courts must
perform under the Crawford decision. Straight-forward application of
Crawford demonstrates that the forensic ipse dixit statutes are
unconstitutional." 7
calibration; (7) no written testing procedures manual; (8) failure to follow generally-accepted
scientific standards with respect to certain tests; (9) inadequate record-keeping; and, (10) failure
to conduct collateral testing." Id. at 504 (quoting ASCLD/LAB report).
113. Id. Even the much-vaunted FBI laboratory suffers from human error and malfeasance.
Recently FBI Ballistics Examiner Kathleen Lundy made false forensic allegations at the 2002
trial of Shane Ragland, who was convicted of killing University of Kentucky football player Trent
DiGiuro. Maurice Possley, Study Shoots Holes in Bullet Analyses by FBI, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11,
2004, at C14.
114. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
115. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
116. For example, spurred by successful defense challenges to state forensic claims about
blood alcohol levels, the Washington state legislature enacted a statute requiring trial courts to
accept, as true, forensic conclusions by the state regarding blood alcohol levels. I am grateful to
the crimprof list serve correspondents for their insightful comments about this statute (e-mails
on file with author).
117. Of course, as discussed in Part VI.A., a defendant always has the option of stipulating to
the contents of the forensic report. The precise constitutional requirements necessary to
demonstrate a constitutionally valid agreement to forgo cross-examination is a subject beyond
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Practitioners and academics generally agree that the primary
goal of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of
evidence. The procedural means to that substantive end are trial
processes that permit the jury to watch accuser and accused face each
other: the accuser makes her claims in the defendant's presence, and
the accused tests the accuser in the "crucible of cross-examination."
' 118
Each aspect of this procedure advances the search for
reliability. First, the witness "stand[s] face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief."119  Second, the cross-examination permits the
defense to test the witness's recollection and to "siftf the conscience of
the witness."'120 Witnessing cross-examination helps "the jury to
unmask false accusers." 121 Another, less frequently identified function
of the Confrontation Clause is its deterrent effect upon falsification of
records and reports, and its corresponding encouragement of careful
recordkeeping and documentation of evidence. 122 Measured against
any of these functions, the forensic ipse dixit statutes fail to serve the
constitutional goals of the Confrontation Clause.
In Crawford, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to
an historical-functionalist view of the Confrontation Clause.123 The
Confrontation Clause must be interpreted in a manner that permits it
to guard against the evils the Framers sought to avoid. 24  The
Confrontation Clause thus seeks to eliminate the use of "ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused."' 25 Those ex parte and
the scope of this Article. However, as discussed in Part IV.E., the "demand waiver" doctrine
employed in the forensic proof-by-affidavit statutes fails constitutional muster.
118. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
119. Barbier v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721 (1968) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895)).
120. Id.
121. Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1003,
1012 (2003).
122. For example, almost all state employees who may be called to testify in criminal trials
receive training in techniques of trial testimony. Their training also includes preemptive tactics
to be used in recordkeeping and documentation of the chain of custody, in order to forestall
successful cross-examination or impeachment.
123. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-61; see Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1985) (holding that
the "right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is primarily a functional right").
124. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43; accord Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987)
(asserting that the Confrontation Clause creates "a 'functional' right designed to promote
reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial"). For a discussion of a similar
functionalist approach to other important Sixth Amendment guarantees, see Pamela R. Metzger,
Beyond the Bright-Line: A Contemporary Right to Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1635,
1689-99 (2003).
125. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
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unexamined modes of evidence are the principal evil that animated
the Framers' enactment of the Confrontation Clause. 126
Crawford stressed that the Confrontation Clause applies to all
"ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine"-that is offered to
prove a fact at trial.127 The Court noted that the "Framers would not
have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did
not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."'1 28
Those same restrictions now protect modern-day criminal
defendants.129
The Crawford decision changed the analytic structure of
confrontation jurisprudence, reversing nearly twenty-five years of case
law generated by Ohio v. Roberts.1 30 Ohio v. Roberts "condition[ed] the
admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it [fell] under a
'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or [bore] 'particularized guarantees
126. Id.
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id. at 53-54.
129. The Crawford Court considered, and rejected, a strict textual analysis of the
Confrontation Clause. 541 U.S. at 42-43 ("The Constitution's text does not alone resolve this
case. One could plausibly read 'witnesses against' a defendant to mean those who actually testify
at trial, those whose statements are offered at trial, or something in-between.") (internal
citations omitted). Instead the Court considered the history of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at
43-50. The Court reviewed the constitutional debates and noted that Federalists and Anti-
Federalists alike abhorred the use of ex parte statements. Id. at 48-50. The Court quoted early
constitutional debates comparing the use of uncross-examined statements with the Spanish
Inquisition and quoted, with approval, the Federal Farmer's assessment of written evidence:
"written evidence ... [is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex parte, and but very
seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth." Id. at 49 (quoting R. LEE, LETTER IV BY THE
FEDERAL FARMER (OCT. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
469, 473 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)). The Court attributed these rationales to the First
Congress's inclusion of "the Confrontation Clause in the proposal that became the Sixth
Amendment." Id.
130. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67-73 (1990). This may be an overstatement, since the
Court made clear that the Confrontation Clause is primarily directed at testimonial statements.
It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, the Ohio v. Roberts test governs the admission
of nontestimonial hearsay offered against a criminal defendant. Crawford dictates that the
testimonial nature of an out-of-court statement triggers the Confrontation Clause analysis. 541
U.S. at 53-54. For a preliminary assessment of the viability of the Ohio v. Roberts doctrine, see
Chris Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-vamps Two Decades of
Confrontation Clause Precedent with Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 45-50 (2004);
Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 572-78 (2005);
Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union:
Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185, 199-211 (2004).
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of trustworthiness."'' 131  Under Roberts, "upon a mere finding of
reliability" by the court, the State could prove its case using untested
ex parte statements. 132 Under Crawford, the first step in assessing
whether the Constitution permits the admission of an out-of-court
statement is determining whether the statement is testimonial.133 If
the statement is testimonial, "the Sixth Amendment demands what
the common law required."'134 Either the declarant must testify (in
which case the Confrontation Clause places no limit upon the
introduction of the declarant's out-of-court statements), or the
prosecution must prove that the witness is unavailable and that the
defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
1 35
The Crawford Court left "for another day [the] effort to spell
out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial'."' 36 However, the Court
shed significant light on the matter by identifying the category of
witnesses whose testimony must be cross-examined. First, the Court
defined a "witness" as "one who bears testimony" against an
accused. 137
The Court then defined the requisite "testimony" as a "solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact."'138 By way of example, the Court stated that an
out-of-court statement is testimonial if the declarant reasonably
expected that the statement would be used prosecutorially. 139
131. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. The Crawford Court criticized the Roberts test as both "too
broad" and "too narrow" inasmuch as it applied "the same mode of analysis whether or not the
hearsay consists of ex parte testimony." Id.
132. Id. In this regard, the critique of Roberts reflects the Court's ongoing preoccupation with
the proper allocation of fact-finding responsibilities. The tenor of the Crawford opinion suggests
that the Roberts rule misallocated responsibility for the assessment of reliability. Under Roberts
the trial court's judicial fact-finding (that the statement was trustworthy or reliable) preempted
the jury's power to assess the reliability of evidence. 448 U.S. at 66. While most jury instructions
advise the jury that it can disregard any evidence it deems incredible, the absence of
confrontation makes this power perfunctory rather than meaningful.
133. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. The inquiry is framed differently if a court considers the
admissibility of a laboratory report when the report's author testifies. Since Crawford places no
limits on the use of an out-of-court statement made by a testifying declarant, state hearsay laws
would be the starting point for an admissibility inquiry. For an analysis of post-Crawford
admissibility of laboratory reports, see Giannelli, Admissibility of Laboratory Reports: The Right
of Confrontation Post-Crawford, supra note 20, at 26.
134. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 51 (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)).
138. Id. (citing WEBSTER, supra note 137).
139. Id. ("An accuser who makes a formal statement to a government officer bears testimony
in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.").
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The Court provided a non-exhaustive list of testimonial
statements. 140 Among those statements that are clearly testimonial
are "extrajudicial statements" that are the "functional equivalent" of
in-court testimony. 141 These include "formalized testimonial
materials" such as affidavits, depositions, grand jury statements,
preliminary hearing testimony, confessions, custodial examinations,
and prior testimony. 142 "[S]imilar pretrial statements that declarant
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially" are testimonial, as
are statements "made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial."'
143
In this functional analysis of the confrontation guarantee, it is
difficult to imagine statements that are more paradigmatically
testimonial than forensic certifications by police laboratory workers.
144
Forensic affidavits are "made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial."'145 Any objective (or marginally
competent) crime lab employee knows that the results of forensic
analysis will be available for use at a later trial. Indeed, most of the
forensic ipse dixit statutes are specifically addressed to the criminal
prosecutions. 1
46
Crime laboratory reports are out-of-court statements designed
to prove a fact (often an essential element) in a criminal case. Law
enforcement gathers, tests, and reports on the sample, solely with the
intent of using the test results in a criminal prosecution. Thus, the
forensic ipse dixit reports exemplify the accusatory statements
targeted by the Confrontation Clause, and admission of the reports is
the admission of testimony produced by "government officers... with
an eye toward trial.'1 47  Presented at trial, these police crime
laboratory reports have "unique potential for prosecutorial abuse-a
140. Id. at 51-52.
141. Id. at 51.
142. Id. at 51-52.
143. Id.
144. As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 169-76, this is true whether the
certificate in question proves only the contents of the report, or also the chain of custody for the
tested substance.
145. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
146. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:499-501 (1992) (explaining that Louisiana's forensic
ipse dixit statute is designed "to provide for proof of certain matters in criminal cases... by
certif[ying]... result[s] of [a] laboratory examination of physical evidence").
147. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56-57 n.7.
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fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which the
Framers were keenly familiar."
148
Under the Roberts and Crawford tests, however, courts have
strained the bounds of logic in order to hold that admission of an ex
parte forensic report does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The
Supreme Court has long required that the government prove the
declarant's unavailability as a prerequisite to the ex parte admission
of certain out-of-court statements. Yet, there is a long-standing line of
cases that illustrates the oft-employed judicial fiction that the
unavailability requirement simply does not apply to state crime
laboratory workers. 149 The assertion seems to be that the actual
examiner would recall little about the particular chemical test at
issue. 150 Accordingly, the argument goes, cross-examination of the
actual examiner is not necessary.1 51 This argument is bolstered by a
volume-equals-accuracy argument: because the examiners perform so
many tests, those tests are highly reliable.
52
Nor can there be any meaningful claim that the forensic
examiners are, in fact, unilaterally unavailable. The forensic
witnesses are available; they simply do not want to travel to court,
wait in court, testify in court, or return from court if the parties
announce a last-minute stipulation. State budget crises and
prospective laboratory efficiencies do not make the examiner
unavailable. Moreover, while crowded court dockets move more
smoothly when fewer witnesses testify, court dockets do not make
witnesses unavailable. The "increased funding of the State Crime
Lab" can enable laboratory employees "to fulfill their laboratorial
duties as well as their duty to provide in-court expert testimony."' 53
The claim of unavailability is nothing more than a fraud.
148. Id. As was discussed in Part III, it is unnecessary to speculate about the "potential for
abuse" in government-initiated forensic evidence. There is nearly universal agreement that
unscrutinized forensic testing facilitates poor science, faulty laboratory protocols, operator error,
and outright falsification of evidence.
149. See, e.g., Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 775 (1st Cir. 1990) (arguing that the
medical examiner is independently reliable and therefore does not need to testify).
150. See, e.g., id. (proposing that in-court testimony is not likely to be based on independent
recollection, but rather on the report already submitted into evidence).
151. See, e.g., id. at 775-76 (holding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated when the
court admitted an autopsy report without any showing that the examiner was unavailable).
152. See, e.g., id. at 775 (holding that an autopsy report is routine and standardized because
of the high-volume of autopsies performed); Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1986)
(arguing that the high volume of analyses performed by laboratory mitigates in favor of ignoring
the unavailability requirement).
153. Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 74, 79 (Ga. 1996) ("[I]ncreased work demands do not make
the expert analysts 'unavailable' to testify.").
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Setting aside the unavailability issue, pre- and post-Crawford,
courts have used specious arguments to justify the forensic ipse dixit
procedure. Prior to Crawford, courts articulated four basic
justifications for permitting an ex parte accusation via the State's
forensic report: the reliability of the report, the report's identity as a
business record; the "legitimate" state interest in conserving
laboratory resources; and the defendant's access to the forensic
witness via his compulsory process right.' 54 To the extent that, even
after Crawford, courts still cling to these rationales, I discuss their
post-Crawford use and viability.
A. Reliability Justifications
Confrontation is one way our system poses for the jury the
question of whether a particular witness's testimony is, in fact,
reliable. While reliability is the goal of the Confrontation Clause, that
goal is achieved when the evidence in question is tested "in the
crucible of cross-examination."'155  "The Clause thus reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence. .. but
about how reliability can best be determined."'' 56 Under the Roberts
test, the out-of-court statements of an unavailable witness could be
offered for their truth, if the court found that the evidence had
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" or reliability. 157
Justifying the admission of "untested testimonial statements"
by their purported trustworthiness and reliability adds insult to
constitutional injury. Yet, both before and after Crawford, courts
have held that forensic affidavits are reliable because they are created
by law enforcement employees in laboratories whose primary function
is to assist the prosecution in proving forensic 'facts' at trial. 158 As
154. Of course, if one concludes that the forensic reports are not testimonial, at most their
admission is limited by the Roberts rule; or, it may be that the Confrontation Clause does not
apply at all to those statements.
155. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
156. Id.
157. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1990).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 755 A.2d 1011, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[Drug
Enforcement Agency] chemists who conduct such analyses do so routinely and generally do not
have an interest in the outcome of trials. In fact, as employees and scientists, they are under a
duty to make accurate reports. It is difficult to perceive any motive or opportunity for the
chemists to falsify." (quoting Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839-40 (D.C. Cir. 1984))
(internal citations omitted)); Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 142 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
"cross-examination of the chemists who prepared report would have been of little use"); Minner
v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that laboratory notes are trustworthy
because, inter alia, they "concern mechanically objective tests," "were taken contemporaneously
with the performance of the tests," and the chemist appears to have followed standard laboratory
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Justice Scalia explained in Crawford, this inverts the Confrontation
Clause's inquiry: "the very factors that make the statements
testimonial," thereby requiring confrontation, are used instead to
conclude that the statements are reliable. 159
Forensic certifications offer "nothing more than the vague
assurances of the prosecuting authority's own employee that proper
testing was done and that the employee is qualified to do the
testing."160  As discussed in Part III, supra, there is no reason to
presume that scientific testing, crime laboratories, technical
equipment, or forensic operators are trustworthy. Yet, courts have
routinely held that the reports are inherently trustworthy.
Some courts have admitted hearsay forensic affidavits simply
because the declarant has certified, under oath, that the report
reflects the delcarant's forensic conclusions. A declarant's oath,
however, is not proof of the declarant's honesty or reliability. 16
1
Moreover, as demonstrated by Justice Scalia's exhaustive review of
the history of the Confrontation Clause, the Framers intended to
prevent the oath from being used as a proxy for confrontation. 162 In
short, "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously
reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty."16 3 Similarly, dispensing with confrontation because
the testimony was produced by a state's examiner is akin to
procedures); Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 507 (D.C. Cir.1993) (finding state-generated
laboratory report "inherently reliable"); United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1360 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that the business records exception to the hearsay rule is "firmly rooted");
Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that, because chemists analyzed
thousands of compounds each year, the resultant laboratory reports are sufficiently reliable to
obviate the need for cross-examination); see also Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he fact sought to be established through admission of the DEA [chemist]
reports.., is determined by a well recognized chemical procedure. Thus, the reports contained
objective facts rather than expressions of opinion."); State v. Hudson, No. 79010, 2002 WL
472304, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2002) (holding that "the trustworthiness of such analyses
has long been recognized by the courts"); State v. Hancock, 825 P.2d 648, 651 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)
(referring to legislative findings that "representatives from the Oregon State Police and the
Oregon District Attorney's Association testified that they could not recall any cases of drugs
being misidentified by laboratory analysis," and that "the accuracy of the chemical analysis of an
alleged controlled substance by the laboratory is almost never challenged").
159. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65.
160. People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 475 (Ill. 2000). The report does not contain, as
the court pointed out, "any information as to how the tests are conducted, what the accepted
scientific procedures are, and what qualifications and training crime lab employees must have."
Id.
161. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (The "absence of oath [is] not dispositive.").
162. See id. at 43-53 (reviewing the origins of the Confrontation Clause and the evils it was
designed to guard against).
163. Id. at 62.
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dispensing with the trial because the State's accusation proves the
offense.
B. The Business Records Rationale
One common judicial sleight of hand is to treat crime
laboratory reports as business or public records. 164 Prior to Crawford,
many courts used the Roberts test to conclude first that police
laboratory reports were business or public records, and second that
they were therefore admissible, without confrontation, under Roberts's
"well-rooted hearsay exception" test.16 5
After Crawford, courts have come to the same erroneous
conclusion using a slightly different analysis. First, they use the
extant hearsay rules to define the crime laboratory reports as business
or public records; second, they rely on Crawford to argue that business
and public records are never testimonial. Accordingly, these courts
have held that the crime laboratory reports are nontestimonial and
therefore admissible without confrontation. Dictum in the Crawford
opinion provides the initial ammunition for this assault on a
defendant's right to confront the forensic declarant. Justice Scalia's
observation that business records are "by their nature not testimonial"
has encouraged courts to reason from the ends desired (proof by
affidavit) to the justification (the nontestimonial nature of business
records). This self-serving analysis misapprehends both Crawford's
rule and its reasoning.
As a preliminary matter, state crime laboratory reports are
neither business nor public records as those terms are used in
evidentiary codes. The business records exception is generally
164. See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that the
forensic ipse dixit statute is "supported by the 'business records' exception to the hearsay rule"
(citing COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE COMMIT-TEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT OF 1981 (April 8, 1981)));
Johnson v. Renico, 314 F.2d 700, 707 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (stating, in dicta, that booking
statements are business records and therefore not testimonial); Smith v. Alabama, 898 So.2d
907, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (reaching the conclusion that autopsy reports are business
records and therefore not testimonial). Some states, such as Louisiana, exclude law enforcement
generated records from the business records exception. See, e.g., LA. CODE EVID. ANN. ART. 803
(2006).
165. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1990). See, e.g., Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314,
1319 (Utah 1983) (holding that a statute authorizing the introduction of breathalyzer certificate,
in lieu of live testimony, to prove breathalyzer results "is a valid exception to the hearsay rule
and does not deny the appellant his right of confrontation"). The Murray opinion also suggests
some reliance on a public interest balancing test in which legitimate governmental interests




assumed to exclude documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. 66
Similarly, the typical public records hearsay rule excludes any record
offered against the accused in a criminal case. 167 Business and public
records are presumed to be reliable in part because they are generated
routinely, by record keepers without any "axe to grind." In contrast,
records prepared in anticipation of litigation are subject to the types of
abuses inherent in any testimony that is generated, ex parte, in
advance of trial. In contrast, crime laboratory reports are prepared as
accusatory documents to be used in prosecuting a particular
defendant.
168
Moreover, even if these laboratory reports could be properly
categorized as business or public records, they are nevertheless
testimonial documents. Crawford untethered the Confrontation
Clause from the rules of evidence. Henceforth, we no longer consider
hearsay rules to determine whether forensic certificates are business
reports. Rather, we ask whether they are testimonial and therefore
subject to confrontation.
Thus, what is "testimonial" will often depend upon its
relevance in a particular case. 169 The mere fortuity that these
testimonial documents can be squeezed into some definition of a public
or business record does not negate the defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation if the statement is used to prove an essential element
of the crime.
Yet an insistence upon ignoring context is precisely how some
courts cheat Crawford's constitutional command. They simply
categorize the crime laboratory reports as business or public records
and then unilaterally proclaim that they are not testimonial.
70
166. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 289 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992); see also
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-15 (1943) (finding that a railroad accident report was not a
business record because its primary purpose was in litigation); People v. McClanahan, 729
N.E.2d 470, 473 (Ill. 2000) (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-15(c) (1998)) (holding a state
statute that admits laboratory reports as evidence unconstitutional without particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness); People v. Smith, 565 N.E.2d 900, 912-14 (Ill. 1990) (holding a
prison incident report inadmissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule).
One might distinguish between mechanical maintenance records confirming routine equipment
tune-ups and particular tests run on particular pieces of evidence connected with particular
crimes.
167. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 166, § 296.
168. Miller v. Georgia, 472 S.E.2d 74, 78 (Ga. 1996) (citing Kesler v. State, 291 S.E.2d 497
(Ga. 1982)) (holding that the conclusory nature of a laboratory report makes it inadmissible as a
business record).
169. Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union:
Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185, 225 (2004).
170. Of course, some judicial discomfort in separating the confrontation analysis from the
hearsay rules is understandable. For many years, the Supreme Court held that "statements
squarely within established hearsay exceptions possess 'the imprimatur of judicial and
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The misapprehension about the testimonial nature of the crime
laboratory reports seems to be this: because the affidavits are
"provided according to scientific procedures and analysis," they are not
testimonial. 171 However, neither Crawford nor the Confrontation
Clause privileges scientific evidence over other categories. 172 Rather,
the Confrontation Clause considers only whether the statement is
testimonial: whether it is an out-of-court declaration that is offered as
a substitute for in-court proof, and that "identifies the perpetrator of
the offense, or directly proves an element of any offense charged in the
indictment."173 A state crime laboratory report is clearly intended to
substitute for in-court proof of an essential element of the offense.
Moreover, these reports are generated under circumstances that
would "lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial."174 Indeed, in
legislative experience' and that fact [weighed] heavily in [judicial] assessment of their reliability
for constitutional purposes." Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 551-52 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
171. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 3, State v. Cunningham, 903 So.2d 1110 (La. 2005) (No.
04-KA-2200).
172. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363 (1992) (Thomas J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[It does not] seem likely that the drafters of the Sixth Amendment intended
to permit a defendant to be tried on the basis of ex parte affidavits found to be reliable.").
173. Reed, supra note 169, at 224.
174. Ross Andrew Oliver, Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert Opinion: The
Intersection of the Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 703 after Crawford v.
Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1539, 1545 (2004). The out-of-court declarant's assertion about
testing results should be distinguished from in-court testimony of an expert that she relied upon
out-of-court statements to reach her expert conclusion. The Confrontation Clause is generally
satisfied by an opportunity to cross-examine the testifying expert; "the expert's opinion-not the
facts that the expert considered-is in evidence, and the defendant has a full opportunity to test
the soundness of that evidence by cross-examining the expert." Id. at 1555; accord Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the
defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose.., infirmities through cross-
examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight
to the witness' testimony."). For example, a government psychiatrist reviews prior out-of-court
statements, made by a number of declarants, in order to assess whether the defendant was
insane at the time of the crime. That psychiatrist then prepares a written psychiatric diagnosis
and evaluation. The psychiatrist's report and evaluation is testimonial because it was made with
an eye toward trial and with the intention of proving a particular fact (i.e., the defendant's
psychiatric condition). However, the underlying records upon which she based her opinion are
probably not testimonial. See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428, 432 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004) (holding that a psychiatrist's use of background records to draw conclusions is not
testimonial). See generally, Oliver, supra, at 1550 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 703
allows "an expert to base his opinion on facts that are inadmissible in evidence, if they are of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts"). The applicability of Crawford to these expert-
foundation questions may turn on whether the out-of-court statement, on which the expert
predicates her opinion, was made with the expectation that it might be used in litigation. In
United States v. Stone, 222 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Tenn. 2004), a civil IRS agent conducted tax audit
interviews while she "served in [an] assisting or cooperating capacity" to criminal investigators.
Id. at 339. At a subsequent criminal tax trial, she testified as a government expert and relied
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general the forensic ipse dixit reports are "prepared solely for the
prosecution's use at trial."175 There can be no question that forensic
laboratory reports are testimonial. 17
6
C. Legitimate State Interests Rationale
Some courts conduct a balancing test, weighing the expense to
the public and the inconvenience to the declarant, against the
defendant's interests in cross-examination. The justification for these
balancing tests seems to be a direct or indirect reliance on the Court's
compromise ruling in Maryland v. Craig,77 which found that a
legitimate public interest could justify denying the defendant an
opportunity for face-to-face confrontation. As explained below,
however, the narrow "public interest" exception carved out in Craig is
wholly inapplicable to the forensic ipse dixit statutes.178
In Craig, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Maryland statute that authorized the trial court, in child abuse cases,
to take the testimony of the alleged victim outside the presence of the
defendant, via one-way closed circuit television.179 The defendant,
Sandra Craig, argued that the absence of face-to-face confrontation
violated her Sixth Amendment rights. °80 A divided Supreme Court
granted the request for certiorari and established a detailed test for
upon the audit interviews to reach her conclusions. Id. at 336. The defense argued that the audit
interviews were testimonial and that the admission of the interviewees' out-of-court statements
violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. The trial court disagreed. Id. at 339. I submit that the
Stone court erred; the interviews should have been treated as testimonial statements since they
were clearly conducted with the expectation of prosecutorial use. For a collection of cases
addressing this issue, see Oliver, supra, at 1555-57 nn.101-12 and accompanying text.
175. City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 595 (Nev. 2004).
176. Post-Crawford, some courts concede the testimonial nature of state crime laboratory
reports. See, e.g., Walsh, 91 P.3d at 595 (finding that blood alcohol testing documents are
testimonial because they are produced specifically for use in a criminal case); People v. Rogers,
780 N.Y.S.2d 383, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that a forensic report is testimonial where
it is "initiated by the prosecution and generated by the desire to discover evidence against
defendant"); see also Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, 11 ("In most circumstances,
the lab report should probably be considered testimonial. Therefore, the lab technician who made
the report should testify at trial if available to do so."); John F. Yetter, Wrestling with Crawford
v. Washington and the New Constitutional Law of Confrontation, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2004, at 26, 34
n.22 ("After Crawford, the safe prosecutorial practice is to call the [laboratory technician] as a
witness. [Laboratory] affidavits look to be within the core concern of Crawford.").
176. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
178. It is unclear whether Maryland v. Craig survives Crawford; if it does, it is not clear
whether it would apply to testimonial, as well as nontestimonial, statements.
179. Craig, 497 U.S. at 842.
180. Id.
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determining when the Confrontation Clause authorizes prosecution
witnesses to testify outside the presence of the defendant.181
The Craig majority refused to recognize an absolute right to
face-to-face confrontation. 8 2  Instead, five Justices held that the
Confrontation Clause expressed a mere "preference" for face-to-face
confrontation, "a preference that 'must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case."' 18 3 The
Craig Court concluded that "if the State makes an adequate showing
of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the
trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important" to
justify a procedure that avoids face-to-face confrontation between
accuser and accused.'
8 4
The Craig Court required a "case-specific" finding of
necessity.185 Before eliminating the traditional face-to-face
confrontation, the trial court must find (1) that the procedure is
"necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who
seeks to testify;"18 6 (2) that the child witness's trauma would stem
from the defendant's presence, and not simply from the courtroom
setting;18 7 and (3) that the emotional distress that the child would
suffer in a face-to-face confrontation is more than "mere nervousness
or excitement or some reluctance to testify."'
88
Justices Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented,
arguing that the majority had utterly overlooked the purposive nature
of the Confrontation Clause. 8 9 In a dissent that foreshadowed his
Crawford opinion, Justice Scalia argued that face-to-face
confrontation is "not a preference 'reflected' by the Confrontation
Clause; it is a constitutional right unqualifiedly guaranteed."'190
Moreover, he asserted that the discomfort or distress associated with
face-to-face confrontation is precisely the reason that the Constitution
requires witness confrontation. 191 Face-to-face confrontation promotes
reliable trial outcomes by "helping the jury to unmask false
181. Id. at 843-50. Note that Craig clarifies the Court's earlier opinion in Coy v. Iowa. See
Coy, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020-22 (1988) (holding that the use of a screen to shield a child witness
from the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause).
182. Craig, 497 U.S. at 844.
183. Id. at 849 (internal citations omitted).
184. Id. at 855.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 856.
188. Id. (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)).
189. Id. at 860-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 866 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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accusers." 192 First, face-to-face confrontation inhibits false statements,
as it is "always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face'
than 'behind his back."' 193 Second, a lie told to the defendant's face
"will often be told less convincingly" than it would have been outside
the defendant's presence. 194 Finally, the demeanor of a lying witness
who is forced to confront the accused may demonstrate the witness's
cupidity. 9
5
Courts often invoke the "legitimate public interest" analysis as
a way of justifying the otherwise impermissible intrusion upon the
Confrontation Clause. 196  However, Craig does not apply to the
forensic certificate statutes.
The Craig opinion considered the extent to which the
Constitution permits in-court procedures that vary from the
traditional face-to-face confrontation imagined by the Framers.197 The
forensic ipse dixit statutes require that courts consider "what
requirements the Confrontation Clause imposes as a predicate for the
introduction of out-of-court declarations."'' 98 Thus, Craig does not
authorize a general public interest exception to the broad right of
confrontation. Rather, it authorizes the trial court to restrict the
manner in which the cross-examination occurs, 199 replacing the face-
to-face confrontation with confrontation via closed-circuit televisions.
In contrast, the forensic ipse dixit statutes eliminate the right to cross-
examination which would otherwise devolve upon the defendant as
soon as the State attempted to use the declarant's out-of-court
statement. 200
Craig cannot be read to carve out a general public interest
exception to any aspect of the Confrontation Clause. Rather, Craig's
acknowledgement of a narrow exception to the confrontation right rule
192. Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1003,
1012 (2003).
193. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1020. For example, the witness may avoid looking at the defendant or may
display, in his demeanor, a discomfort associated with the making of untrue statements.
196. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) ("Of course, the right to
confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.").
197. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-50 (1990); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
358 (1992) ("Craig involved only the question of what in-court procedures are constitutionally
required to guarantee a defendant's confrontation right once a witness is testifying.").
198. White, 502 U.S. at 358.
199. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849.
200. In view of Justice Scalia's strong belief in the importance of face-to-face confrontation, it




was based on fact-specific harms that might devolve upon the
particular victim in an alleged child abuse case. Thus, Craig requires
a case-by-case assessment both of the legitimate public interest at
stake and of the particular harm that would follow from cross-
examination. In contrast, the forensic ipse dixit statutes present
public interests that are neither fact-specific nor compelling. They do
not address the permanent psychological harm that might befall a
child victim; rather, they address the general public interest in
conserving funds.20 1 The statutes are blanket, legislative assessments
that the public interest is best served by reducing the costs of criminal
prosecutions.
The public interest rationale is often accompanied by an
expression of judicial confidence in the defendant's ability to vindicate
his rights through the Compulsory Process Clause. According to this
rationale, compulsory process offers the defendant an "alternative
means" to cross-examine the witness, 202 thus curing any violation of
the Confrontation Clause. As discussed below, this rationale is
unsound.
D. Compulsory Process Rationale
The Compulsory Process Clause is a constitutional entitlement,
not a safety valve that legitimizes otherwise unconstitutional
violations of the Confrontation Clause. 20 3 Yet, some courts have
claimed that the compulsory process power moots any confrontation
violation created by the forensic certificate statutes.20 4 According to
201. State v. Crow, 974 P.2d 100, 111 (Kan. 1999) ("[The Kansas legislature determined the
public has a significant interest in avoiding the unnecessary expense of insuring the presence of
laboratory technicians at trials where the content of their testimony will not be challenged by
defendants.").
202. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1321-22 (Utah 1983); see also Crampton v. State,
525 A.2d 1087, 1089 (Md. App. 1987) (stating that the notice and demand statute being
challenged, which was characterized as a business records exception, "diminishes" the
confrontation right but "does not completely abolish that right").
203. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
204. See, e.g., Murray City, 663 P.2d at 1322 (holding that a statute relieving the state of the
burden of calling, as a witness in every DUI case, the public officer responsible for testing the
accuracy of the breathalyzer created "a very limited intrusion upon an accused's right of
confrontation"); Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 775 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the
introduction into evidence of an autopsy report, without live testimony, did not violate the
defendant's right to confrontation because of the availability of compulsory process); Reardon v.
Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that since there would have been little utility
in requiring the State to produce both the assisting chemists and the lead chemist, the




this argument, the defendant can subpoena the declarant to appear at
trial and can examine the declarant as a hostile witness on the
defendant's case-in-chief.
20 5
If this is true there is no reason to limit the compulsory-
process-as-confrontation-cure to forensic proof. Rather, taken to its
logical extension, this argument means that the State could introduce
all of its trial by affidavit, since the defendant retains the power to
subpoena the witnesses to court.206 This result would be patently
absurd. The "principal evil at which the [Confrontation] Clause was
directed was... the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, particularly
the.., use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused. '20 7 The Compulsory Process Clause does not make the
Confrontation Clause mere surplusage. Rather, the Confrontation
Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause serve two different and
unique procedural functions.
208
A defendant's right to confront the State's witnesses is
"designed to restrain the prosecution by regulating the procedures by
which it presents its case against the accused."20 9 This confrontation
right applies "in every case, whether or not the defendant seeks to
rebut the case against him or to present a case of his own."210  In
contrast, the right to compulsory process "comes into play at the close
of the prosecution's case" and "operates exclusively at the defendant's
initiative."21
1
Some forensic ipse dixit statutes explicitly "grant" the
defendant a right to compulsory process as a "cure" for any
confrontation violation that arises upon admission of the certificate
without live testimony.21 2 Some courts have agreed. 213 The very
205. But see People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 477 (Ill. 2000) (holding that securing the
author of a lab report sought to be introduced into evidence is a "mandatory constitutional
obligation of the prosecuting authority"). The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the grammatical
construction of the Sixth Amendment does not say "that the accused has a right to confront the
witnesses against him." Id. Rather, it says that "the accused has a right to be confronted with
witnesses against him." Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 8).
206. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d at 477 (pointing out that "[tirial by affidavit is the primary
evil that the confrontation clause was designed to prevent").
207. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36 (2004).
208. See generally Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing
Compulsory Process, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275 (2002) (discussing the history and purpose of the
Compulsory Process Clause).
209. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 n.14 (1988) (quoting with approval Peter Westen,
The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 74 (1974)).
210. Westen, supra note 209, at 74.
211. Id.
212. Since the Compulsory Process Clause is part of the federal Constitution, a statutory
right to compulsory process is hardly a boon.
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phrasing of these statutes reflects how deeply legislators have bought
into the notion that compulsory process and confrontation are but two
sides of the same coin.
Compulsory process, however, is not. an antidote to the
confrontation violation. As the Supreme Court has explained, the
compulsory process right "is dependent entirely upon the defendant's
initiative. 214 In contrast, most other "Sixth Amendment rights arise
automatically on the initiation of the adversary process and no action
by the defendant is necessary to make them active in his or her
case."215 When a defendant invokes the Compulsory Process Clause,
he gives up his right to rely on the government's failure of proof.
Instead, he must present a case to the jury, using a hostile State
witness, who knows that she has been called to testify so that the
defense can impeach her.216  In short, even if the Constitution
permitted legislatures to ration constitutional entitlements as an
"either or" proposition, compulsory process is not an adequate
substitute for confrontation. 217
E. The Demand- Waiver Feint
In Crawford's wake, we can anticipate that the confrontation
debate will turn to the validity of procedural mechanisms that
decrease the likelihood that a defendant will actually confront the
forensic examiner. Chief among these mechanisms is the demand-
waiver doctrine aggressively enforced in the forensic ipse dixit
statutes. 21
8
213. State v. Pearson, 633 N.W.2d 81, 84-85 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding that a state statute
which allowed a blood analysis report to be admitted in evidence without live witness by the
person who administered the blood test did not violate the state constitution because "a
defendant in a criminal case may challenge the accuracy or reliability of the test" through a
subpoena).
214. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410.
215. Id.
216. See State v. Clark, 964 P.2d 766, 772-73 (Mont. 1998) (pointing out that a state ipse
dixit statue "effectively required [the defendant] to subpoena and produce the State's expert in
order to rightfully take advantage of the protection afforded him under the Confrontation
Clause").
217. See, e.g., Wigglesworth v. Oregon, 49 F.3d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
Oregon's forensic ipse dixit statute was unconstitutional, even though the defendant had a
compulsory process right to subpoena the state crime laboratory worker).
218. Johnson v. State, 792 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Ark. 1990) (concluding that the defendant's
failure to notify "the State to bring the witness to trial" constitutes waiver of the right to confront
that witness); State v. Crow, 974 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Kan. 1999) (holding a demand-waiver statute
constitutional because the "accused has the right to determine whether the contents of a report
concerning forensic examinations will be contested at trial").
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The Supreme Court has already considered, and rejected, the
application of a constitutional demand-waiver doctrine in the speedy
trial context. In a demand-waiver procedure, "a prior demand is a
necessary condition to the consideration" of the constitutional right.219
The demand-waiver doctrine also holds that a defendant waives any
consideration of a right as to which he has not made a pretrial
demand.220 In a demand-waiver schema, it is irrelevant why the
defense did not file a demand. There are no distinctions made
between the overworked public defender, the lawyer who learns
something new and important at trial, or the inevitable oversights
that occur in the most careful of law offices. Failure to demand
constitutes a "waiver" of the right.
In the forensic ipse dixit context, failure to demand that the
State prove its case by live witnesses forever forecloses the defendant
from confronting and cross-examining crucial State witnesses. Silence
becomes waiver.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has firmly rejected
the suggestion that a court may presume the "waiver of a fundamental
right from inaction."221 A demand-waiver policy is wholly "inconsistent
with [the Supreme] Court's pronouncements on waiver of
constitutional rights."222 Waiver is 'an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege. '"' 223  Silence is not
"acquiescence" to the "loss of fundamental rights."224
In the speedy trial context, as in the forensic certificate cases,
courts and prosecutors have argued that waiver of the right in
question advantaged, rather than disadvantaged, the criminal
defendant. However, the Court declined to burden the defendant with
the responsibility of invoking his Sixth Amendment right: "A
defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty
as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due
process."
225
219. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972).
220. Id. at 524-25.
221. Id. at 525.
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
224. Id. at 526 (quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
225. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972). The Supreme Court did hold that the
defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right was one of four factors to be considered in any
assessment of the constitutionality of delay. Id. at 528-30. However, this reflected the Court's




The Court also criticized the demand-waiver doctrine for
placing defense counsel in an "awkward position."226 Unless counsel
demands the right, counsel is in danger of frustrating his client's right
to a speedy trial.227 The Court explained that, in practice, a demand-
waiver rule would produce "either an automatic, pro forma demand
made immediately after appointment of counsel or delays which, but
for the demand-waiver rule, would not be tolerated.."228 The same is
true of the forensic ipse dixit statutes, particularly those which require
counsel to guess whether the State will introduce a forensic affidavit,
or those which require counsel to make affirmative representations
about the defense prior to the government's presentation of its case in
chief. Under these statutes, the results are not "consistent with the
interests of defendants, society, or the Constitution.
229
In the anticipatory demand statutes, application of the
demand-waiver doctrine is particularly absurd. As the American Bar
Association argued in a passage cited favorably by the Supreme Court,
"there are a number of situations, such as where the defendant is
unaware of the charge or where the defendant is without counsel, in
which it is unfair to require a demand" to his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial.230 Similarly, if a defendant does not know whether
the government will rely on forensic hearsay, is it not nonsensical and
unfair to require him to demand to confront the declarant?
V. DUE PROCESS
One consistent feature of our constitutional criminal procedure
system is its use of procedural rules to effectuate constitutional
values. The forensic ipse dixit statutes are a perversion of this
process; they use procedural rules to undermine constitutional values.
As I explain below, the forensic ipse dixit gambit converts a partisan
crime laboratory report into proof of an essential element, violating
the reasonable doubt rule and cheating the Constitution.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
guarantees a "fundamental right that protects 'the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
226. Id. at 527.
227. Id. at 528.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 528 n.28 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SPEEDY TRIAL 17 (Approved Draft 1968)).
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necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."' 231 This is
the reasonable doubt rule.23 2 The Constitution's criminal procedures
enforce this rule by requiring that "proof burdens and rules of
evidence.., bias the outcome against erroneous conviction and toward
erroneous acquittal." 233  This bias in favor of acquittal is a core
constitutional value. Procedures and presumptions that undermine
the reasonable doubt rule, and flout the acquittal bias, violate the
Constitution.
Of course, the forensic ipse dixit statutes are often little more
than a deliberate attempt to roll back the reasonable doubt rule by
relieving the prosecution of its burden of proof as to an essential
element. The primary mechanism for this constitutional cheat is the
legislative sleight-of-hand that makes a properly prepared forensic
report prima facie proof of its contents. Regardless of their
consequences for confrontation, these forensic prima facie statutes
create unconstitutional mandatory presumptions. 234
The forensic proof con game conflates the State's burden of
production and the State's burden of persuasion. Production of the
requisite evidence satisfies the burden of persuasion and
simultaneously "establishes" the fact for which the evidence is
offered. 235 Thus, production of a crime laboratory report is prima facie
231. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970)). The Supreme Court did not formally announce this rule until its opinion in Winship in
1970. For nearly 200 years prior to Winship, however, courts and commentators had assumed
that due process required that the prosecution prove each element of the charged offense by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362 (citing Supreme Court cases dating
back to 1881).
232. The reasonable doubt standard occupies a prominent place in our civic mythology.
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."). However,
Winship's promise is rarely realized; the vast majority of defendants plead guilty. While there
are many reasons to allow and even promote plea bargains, the absence of any adversary testing
of proof plagues our criminal justice system. As a result, scholars, judges, and practitioners have
argued that our plea bargaining system renders Winship moot. The reasonable doubt standard
affects the criminal justice system only in those few cases that go to trial and in those unusual
cases in which the reasonable doubt standard deters the prosecution from bringing charges.
233. Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1665, 1690 (1987).
234. While the term prima facie is subject to definition by state rules and interpretation by
individual judges, there are common understandings that guide an inquiry into the role of prima
facie evidence. "The term 'prima facie evidence' denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient in a jury case to carry the case to the jury and to sustain a verdict in
favor of the issue which it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence." 29 AM.
JUR. 2D Evidence § 4 (1994). Black's Law Dictionary defines prima facie evidence as "[e]vidence
that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 598 (8th ed. 2004).
235. See sources cited supra note 234.
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or per se persuasion that the State has proven, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the truth of the laboratory's conclusions.
236
Consider, for example, a drug possession case. The State
produces, in the required form, a crime laboratory certificate claiming
that the laboratory tests demonstrate that evidence seized from the
defendant contains an illegal controlled substance. 237 Relying on the
forensic prima facie statute, the trial court then instructs the jury that
the State has proven that the substance in question was, in fact, an
illegal controlled substance. Thus, the forensic ipse dixit process
converts the crime laboratory report into proof of an essential
element. 238  The statute removes an element from the jury's
consideration.
A. The Reasonable Doubt Rule
Scholars generally agree that the reasonable doubt rule serves
three basic purposes.239 First, the reasonable doubt rule creates a
concrete procedural structure in which to house the presumption of
innocence. 240 This "high standard of proof' is generally thought to be
"necessary... to ensure against unjust convictions by giving substance
to the presumption of innocence." 241 The difficulty involved in meeting
the standard serves as a "prime instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error."
242
Second, the reasonable doubt rule enforces a constitutional bias
in favor of erroneous acquittals and against erroneous convictions. In
Justice Harlan's words, the reasonable doubt standard reflects "a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."
243
236. See sources cited supra note 234.
237. See, e.g., In re J.W., 597 So.2d 1056, 1058-59 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (asserting that the
State must prove that the substance recovered from the defendant is indeed illegal).
238. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 964 P.2d 766, 771-72 (Mont. 1998) (detailing the forensic ipse
dixit process). As discussed infra Part V.B.2, whether, and to what extent, the legislature can
take "legislative notice" of facts and deem them proven upon production of a particularized
predicate is the subject of much scholarly debate. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text.
239. Note, Winship on Rough Waters: The Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1993).
240. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
241. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972).
242. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. "Every shift in the burden of proof from the government to the
defendant increases 'the risk of convictions resting on factual error."' Nancy J. King & Susan B.
Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1535 (2001) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at
363).
243. Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Third, the reasonable doubt standard helps adjust a playing
field that is tilted toward the prosecution. 244  In part, the rule
recognizes that many defense attorneys will be unable to conduct a
thorough investigation 245 or trial preparation. Accordingly, many
defendants will be inadequately represented. The reasonable doubt
rule helps compensate for the unequal distribution of legal resources.
B. Understanding Presumptions and Burdens of Proof
While the reasonable doubt rule allocates the burden of proof
and restricts the use of presumptions, presumptions are not
inherently unconstitutional. Rather, the reasonable doubt rule forbids
only those presumptions that lessen the prosecution's burden of proof
or that improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Such a
presumption is unconstitutional when the presumed fact constitutes
an element of the offense that "must be either proved or presumed" as
a precondition to conviction. 246 A proper understanding of this aspect
of the reasonable doubt rule requires a brief review of burdens and
presumptions.
1. The Burden of Proof
The generic term "burden of proof' can be broken into three
component parts: the burden of production, the burden of persuasion,
and the standard of proof. The burden of production requires a party
to properly raise an issue to put that issue into play. The burden of
persuasion requires a party to meet a designated standard of proof as
to the issues at play; if a party cannot meet its burden of proof, the
finder of fact must find against that party. 247 The standard of proof
refers to the quantum of proof required to sustain the burden of
persuasion. 248 Thus, in a criminal case, the prosecution bears the
burden of production as to all elements of the offense. It also bears
244. For a discussion of a functionalist approach to the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee
as a means of leveling the playing field, see Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A
Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1635 (2003).
245. Winship on Rough Waters, supra note 239, at 1095 n.14.
246. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317 (1985) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 215 (1977)).
247. Lawrence Solum, You Prove It! Why Should I?, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 691, 691
(1994). Professor Solum uses slightly different terminology. He divides burdens into two parts:
the burden of persuasion and the burden of production. He further subdivides the burden of
persuasion into two parts: the risk of nonpersuasion, which I call the burden of persuasion; and,
the standard of proof. Id.
248. Id. at 691-92.
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the burden of persuasion as to all elements of the offense. The
standard of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Because the prosecution must prove all elements of a crime, a
failure as to one element is tantamount to a failure as to all elements.
This bundling of the burden of proof as an "all or nothing" package is
deceptively simple; affirmative defenses, lesser-included offenses, and
evidentiary presumptions make matters much more complicated.
The reasonable doubt burden of proof does not mean that the
legislature cannot enact any presumptions. However, it does prohibit
"the State from using evidentiary presumptions... that have the effect
of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt of every essential element of a crime."249 This prohibition on
burden-relief is based, in part, on the risk that presumptions may
result in "erroneous factual determination."250 Scholars, practitioners,
and courts grapple with the proper application of Winship's rule to
evidentiary presumptions and affirmative defenses. 251 Indeed, one
reason states have been so successful in their burden-shifting cheat is
that it is difficult to understand, and even harder to enforce, the
constitutional limits of presumptions. 25 2
2. Presumptions
Presumptions fall into two general categories: permissive
presumptions and mandatory presumptions. A permissive
presumption "leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject" the
presumption and leaves the burden of proof squarely upon the
prosecution. 253 A permissive presumption violates due process only if,
under the particular facts of a particular case, no rational trier of fact
could find, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the basic fact
proves (via the presumption) the elemental fact.254  Thus, to
successfully challenge a permissive presumption, a defendant must
249. Francis, 471 U.S. at 313.
250. County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 157 (1979).
251. The complexity of these aspects of the reasonable doubt rule facilitates constitutional
cheating by disguising operation of the three component parts of the burden of proof.
252. Moreover, there has been substantial criticism of the Winship doctrine as it has been
applied in cases such as Wilbur. One of the most common critiques is the positivist argument
that the legislature, which has the power to define crimes and defenses, must surely also have
the power to shift the burden of proof as to defenses and, perhaps, as to matters that might be
considered elements of the offense. For further discussion of the rationality of the Supreme
Court's reasonable doubt jurisprudence, see Matt Nichols, Victor v. Nebraska: The 'Reasonable
Doubt'Dilemma, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1709 (1995).
253. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157 (citations omitted).
254. Id.
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demonstrate that the presumption is invalid as applied to his or her
case.
2 55
In contrast, a mandatory presumption requires the trier of fact
to find the elemental fact once the prosecutor proves the basic fact.
Mandatory presumptions are always unconstitutional. 256  As the
Supreme Court has explained, "the trial court may not withdraw or
prejudge the issue" on trial.257 Neither the legislature nor the court
may "invade [the] fact finding function" which belongs solely to the
trier of fact.
258
There are two categories of mandatory presumptions:
mandatory conclusive presumptions and mandatory rebuttable
presumptions. A mandatory conclusive presumption removes "the
presumed element from the case entirely if the State proves the
predicate facts."259 Once the State proves the basic fact, the conclusive
presumption prevents the jury from making an independent
determination about the presumed element. 260 Production of the basic
255. Id.
256. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522 (1979).
257. Id. (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952)). Similarly, when the
trial court's instructions amount to a directed verdict on one or more elements of the offense, the
court has relieved the State of its burden of proof. See, e.g., State v. Jackman, 104 P.3d 686, 690
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
258. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523. The legislature might, in some circumstances, lawfully
craft a new substantive offense that did not depend upon the element to be proved by
presumption. See State v. Rotax, 497 A.2d 378, 380 (Vt. 1985) (noting that the legislature
eliminated the intent element from a low-level offense). However, there may also be
constitutional limits on the legislative ability to eliminate certain core substantive elements from
the definition of crimes. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Carella suggests an alternative
interpretation of the Supreme Court's stance on clarifying and strengthening the standard of
proof as to the elements of an offense. As Justice Scalia explained, the Supreme Court "has
disapproved the use of mandatory conclusive presumptions not merely because it '"conflict[s]
with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused,"' but also
because it 'invade[s] [the] fact-finding function' which in a criminal case the law assigns solely
to the jury." Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 268 (1989) (internal citations omitted). In that
regard, the Supreme Court regards the reasonable doubt standard as a structural protection.
259. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317 (1985); see also Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 406
n.10 (1991) ("[T]he terms of a conclusive presumption tend to deter a jury from considering any
evidence for the presumed fact beyond the predicate evidence."). McCormick's treatise on
evidence offers an alternative characterization of mandatory conclusive presumptions: "[I]f it is
proven that a child is under seven years of age, the courts have stated that it is conclusively
presumed that she could not have committed a felony. In so doing, the courts are not stating a
presumption at all, but simply expressing the rule of law that someone under seven years old
cannot legally be convicted of a felony." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 519 (John W. Strong
ed., 5th ed. 1999).
260. John M.M. Greabe, Spelling Guilty Out of a Record? Harmless-Error Review of
Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. REV. 819, 834
(1994).
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fact is successful persuasion as to the elemental fact. By definition, a
defendant can never rebut a mandatory conclusive presumption.261
In contrast, a mandatory rebuttable presumption does not
irrevocably remove the presumed element from the jury's
consideration. Rather, the rebuttable presumption requires the jury
to find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades the jury
that such a finding is unwarranted.262 If the defendant does not "come
forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection
between the two facts," the trial court will instruct the jury that the
prosecution has met its burden of proof with regard to the presumed
element. 263  Thus, a mandatory rebuttable presumption both (1)
relieves the prosecution of the burden of production and persuasion as
to the presumed elemental fact; and (2) reallocates the burden of
production, and sometimes the burden of proof, to the defendant to
rebut the presumed elemental fact.264
Both of these mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional.
Both impermissibly invade the jury's function and relieve the
prosecution of its burden of proof. However, a conclusive mandatory
presumption precludes further consideration of the presumed element;
a rebuttable mandatory presumption permits further consideration of
that element but shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to rebut
the presumption.
C. Presumptions and the Forensic Ipse Dixit Statutes
To understand how the forensic prima facie statutes
circumvent the reasonable doubt rule, it is helpful to consider their
actual application in a simple notice and demand DUI statute that
makes a state laboratory report prima facie proof of the level of
narcotics in a defendant's blood. Our hypothetical defendant is
alleged to have had an illegal percentage of narcotics present in his
blood stream. How does the forensic ipse dixit statute shift the burden
of proof?
First, the statute makes the prosecution's forensic report
admissible proof of the chain of custody. This means that the report
proves two basic facts: (1) the state crime laboratory tested a blood
sample actually taken from the accused; and (2) the report issued
261. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 259, § 342; see also Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522-
23 (stating that a mandatory conclusive presumption directs a jury to find against a defendant
on a particular fact or element once the State establishes certain facts).
262. Francis, 471 U.S. at 317.
263. County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
264. Id. at 157 n.16.
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about the defendant's blood sample claims that a forensic analysis
revealed the presence of an illegal narcotic substance. Second, the
statute makes the forensic report prima facie proof that the contents
of the report are true. Third, the prima facie presumption converts
the crime laboratory report (an ex parte accusation) into an elemental
fact, unless the defendant rebuts the connection between the basic fact
(the forensic examiner's claim: tests showed narcotics were in the
defendant's blood stream) and the essential fact (narcotics were, in
fact, in the defendant's blood stream).
For example, Ohio's pattern jury instructions define "prima
facie" evidence as evidence that "may be sufficient evidence to
establish [the presumed fact], unless contradicted or explained away
by other evidence of equal or greater weight."265 This language avoids
the prohibited "mandatory conclusive presumption" but shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant, thereby creating a mandatory
rebuttable presumption.
Of course, as discussed in Part IV, the forensic proof statutes
prevent the defendant from cross-examining any State forensic
witness. Since no knowledgeable forensic witness will testify on the
State's case, the defendant has no witness to cross-examine to
challenge either the accuracy of the test or the integrity of the tester.
Thus, the presumption of the elemental fact is rebuttable if, and only
if, the defendant puts on a case.266 This is classic burden shifting in
defiance of the Constitution.
D. How Courts Justify the Presumption
In an effort to insulate unconstitutional presumption from
successful constitutional challenges, state courts legislate from the
bench by asserting that they have instructed on a permissive
presumption, rather than on a mandatory presumption. 267 Setting
aside the question of whether sound policy favors a rule under which
individual trial courts rewrite unconstitutional laws, a technically
correct jury instruction cannot cure the unconstitutionality inherent
in the ipse dixit forensic proof process.
265. OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 5.15(2) (2002).
266. Although, in theory, a defendant might attempt to rebut the State's forensic claim
through cross-examination of other witnesses, this tactic is unlikely to succeed.
267. This is consistent with the Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that jury instructions
which properly allocate the burden of proof can save statutes that would otherwise violate the
prohibition against mandatory presumptions. Of course, this presents another easy opportunity
for constitutional cheating. If a proper jury charge will cure an otherwise unconstitutional
statute that shifts the burden of proof, a rational legislature has no motivation, other than good
conscience, to restrict itself to enacting constitutional presumptions.
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Yet reviewing courts have justified these unconstitutional
presumptions by pointing the finger at the defendant. Since the
defendant cannot show "that forcing him to call the chemist during his
own case caused him any prejudice,"268 courts simply ignore the
consequences of the constitutional cheat and claim that it is
inconsequential whether a defendant has been forced to rebut the
State's proof on his own case-in-chief.
The forensic ipse dixit statutes portend tragic consequences for
the constitutional integrity of our criminal procedure. The reasonable
doubt rule is a bedrock foundation of our adversary system, and it is
intended to guard against erroneous convictions by biasing fact-
finders toward acquittal. Mandatory presumptions permit the
legislature to usurp the fact finding function reserved for a jury,
thereby eliminating the acquittal bias. If legislatures can "obliterate
the procedural protections in the Bill of Rights," then our
"constitutional criminal procedural guarantees [become] largely
meaningless."269
In addition, there are basic burden-shifting consequences to
this constitutional cheat. Forcing a defendant to subpoena the state
chemist necessarily means the defendant cannot challenge the State's
forensic report until after the government rests its case.270 Some
courts trivialize this constitutional violation as routine, claiming that
"[e]very defendant who presents a defense" experiences this
prejudice. 271 But the constitutional issue is not whether a defendant
takes risks when he chooses to present a case, but whether the
legislature has forced the defendant to put on a case in order to bring
an essential element of the offense within the ordinary
decisionmaking power of the jury.
When the State must meet its burden on the State's case-in-
chief, the defendant has choices beyond a simple decision about
whether to put on a defense. He can rely entirely upon the
268. Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
269. King & Klein, supra note 242, at 1496. For an alternative view, see, e.g., Douglas
Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clause
Nonjusticable, 60 TEX. L. REV. 875, 890 (1982) (noting that some commentators, though not
Laycock, argue that the legislature controls both substance and process, and that the Due
Process Clause is nonjusticiable).
270. See, e.g., Brown, 627 A.2d at 507 n.13 (noting that the defendant argued his
constitutional rights had been violated since he had an "immediate right to confront the
witness," but was instead "forced to wait until the government rested"). The defendant in that
case also claimed that "by challenging the evidence he risked bolstering it." Id. Of course, the





presumption of innocence and exercise his constitutional right to do
nothing. He can exercise his right to cross-examine the State's
forensic witness and can challenge the chain of custody, the tester's
credentials, the accuracy of the scientific methodology, or the
laboratory protocols. Or, the defendant can insist that the State
bargain for the proof-benefit the State hopes to acquire and stipulate
to the forensic element in exchange for some benefit.
In addition, a defendant who subpoenas the state laboratory
worker to challenge the elemental fact necessarily presents his
defense through a hostile witness employed by the prosecution. When
the proof by affidavit is authorized by an evidentiary rule, any
damaging statements elicited from the prosecution's forensic declarant
go to the credibility of the facts contained in the report and not to the
admissibility of the report itself.272 In essence, "[b]y the time the
defendant is allowed to begin the race, the state has already crossed
the finish line."2
73
Finally, even if a court strictly construes a forensic ipse dixit
statute as creating a permissive presumption, the ipse dixit statute
nevertheless operates, de facto, as a mandatory presumption. The ipse
dixit statutes are designed to excuse the State from calling, and to
prevent the defense from cross-examining, any forensic witness.
When the ipse dixit statute operates to keep forensic witnesses off of
the witness stand, a defendant can rebut the permissive presumption
only by presenting a defense case. 274 If the defendant does not call any
witnesses, and cannot elicit relevant cross-examination, the defendant
cannot rebut the presumption; he can only hope that the jury will
conclude that the State has not met its burden. Even when the
legislature's words create a permissive presumption, the
Confrontation Clause violation morphs that permissive presumption
into a mandatory presumption. After all, absent confrontation, the
defense stands little chance of discrediting the forensic report. The
elimination of cross-examination reveals the legislature's true intent:
ex parte accusations made by police laboratories are readily and
routinely converted into proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of an
essential element of the crime.
272. State v. Smith, 323 S.E.2d 316, 333 (N.C. 1984).
273. Id.




VI. WHAT THE FORENSIC IPSE DmXIT PHENOMENON REVEALS
Why should we believe that constitutional cheats like the
forensic ipse dixit statutes reveal something deeper and more
profound than a general distaste for expensive criminal trials and an
often-correct assumption that the accused are guilty? Certainly we
could try to understand the forensic ipse dixit phenomenon as a
unique result of the war on drugs that has dragged other forensic
issues along in its wake. This would be a serious error.
True, drug-war hysteria may have provided the impetus for the
initial forensic ipse dixit rules. 275 However, the drug war alone cannot
explain why state legislatures fight back by cheating the Constitution.
Nor can the drug war explain the startling uniformity of the cheating
methodology, or the jurisprudential gymnastics that rationalize the
legality of these statutes. 276 Something deeper is afoot.
A. Assuming and Preferring Adversary Failure
The forensic ipse dixit procedures illustrate a fundamental
legislative assumption of system failure. Lawmakers assume that the
criminal justice system minimizes costs and maximizes efficiency
when defense counsel must initiate adversary procedures by filing
labor and fact-intensive claims of entitlement. 277 In deference to this
assumption, legislators structure forensic proof rules to require that
275. Legislators have described the narcotics trade as a matter of national security. As a
result, for nearly 35 years, heightened enforcement has been both "straining resources and
serving as a justification for the dilution for traditional procedures of law enforcement and
criminal prosecution." Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War
on Drugs: A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescript White
Powder in Narcotics Prosecutions, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 559 (1998). During 2000 there were
1,579,566 arrests for drug offenses. RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, DISTORTED PRIORITIES: DRUG
OFFENDERS IN STATE PRISONS 1 (2002) (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (2000)). This number represents a threefold
increase from only twenty years before when, in 1980, there were 580,900 drug arrests. Id.
"There is little doubt that the perceived exigencies of the drug war impact evidentiary decisions
on narcotics prosecutions." Blanchard & Chin, supra, at 559-60.
276. According to Professor Dripps, "process-oriented theories of judicial review would
suggest that unconstitutional legislation will rarely be confined to a single jurisdiction [because]
the political pressures that produce its adoption in one place are likely to operate more broadly."
Dripps, supra note 233, at 1692.
277. In this regard, constitutional cheats are more likely to succeed when they are fact-
intensive, rather than pro forma, invocations of constitutional rights. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz,
The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 38-
40 (1997) (discussing why defense attorneys are more likely to make suppression motions than
engage in other, more affirmative, discovery, investigation, motions, and trial defenses).
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the defense take affirmative steps to initiate the (resource-intensive)
exercise of constitutional rights.
278
To confirm that a presumption of defense failure undergirds
the structure of the forensic cheating statutes, we need only consider
the other possible procedures that legislatures might have enacted to
conserve forensic resources. After all, there is no abstract, structural
reason to assume that the ipse dixit statutes would best meet this
cost-savings goal. Presume, for a moment, that we credit the
legislative justification for these statutes: the testing is reliable and
defense counsel rarely choose to challenge the crime laboratory
witness.279 Why, then, do legislators universally prefer forensic ipse
dixit rules over other, less burdensome procedural structures? Had
legislators simply intended to make forensic-based prosecutions
cheaper, there are many ways to do so without bypassing the
Constitution.
For example, a legislature might enact criminal codes that use
simple, old-fashioned housekeeping to conserve forensic resources.
Each regional courthouse could be required to have a regular schedule
of days on which the judges would hear motions and sit at trials that
require the appearance of forensic witnesses. This would enable state
crime laboratory workers to consolidate their court appearances,
thereby limiting the amount of time they spend out of the laboratory,
traveling to court, and testifying. So long as this schedule does not
create Sixth Amendment speedy trial issues, or violate state speedy
trial provisions, the system would gain efficiency without sacrificing
rules that promote accuracy and fairness.
Another method of gaining efficiency would be to rely upon
stipulations. A statute that requires prosecutors to offer to stipulate
to the crime laboratory report would, in theory, serve the same
function as the ipse dixit statutes. Consider the following hypothetical
statute:
278. It is axiomatic that responsible defense counsel must request and review the chain-of-
custody and laboratory records in order to make an informed decision about the defense strategy.
However, most forensic ipse dixit statutes do not provide information about underlying data or
chain-of-custody records. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. Of course, fear of
sentencing consequences might discourage an effective and zealous defense attorney from
pursuing forensic discovery, particularly if the client indicates a belief that the laboratory results
are substantially correct. See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating
Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2111-12
(2003) (asserting that judges use the "acceptance of responsibility" provision of the federal
sentencing guidelines to penalize defendants whose lawyers over-zealously represent them.
"Lawyers... play a game of all-or-nothing by balancing the chance that zealous advocacy will
result in acquittal against the potential negative consequences for their clients if it does not.").
279. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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In every criminal case in which the State plans to introduce proof concerning evidence
gathered, stored, or analyzed by the State Crime Laboratory:
(1) The prosecution shall offer to the defense, by no less than 20 days before trial
(a) copies of any and all forensic reports, tests, and analyses that support forensic
conclusions that the State intends to prove at trial; together with
(b) a written offer to stipulate to the results of those reports, tests, and analyses;
(2) However,
(a) upon oral or written representation, by a State prosecutor, to the trial court, that
the effective presentation of the State's trial case requires live testimony from forensic
witnesses, the prosecution shall not be required to offer to stipulate to the forensic
evidence;
(b) if this representation is made after a stipulation has already been entered, then,
upon request of the defense, the trial court shall grant a continuance of no less than 20
days so that the defense can prepare to cross-examine about the forensic evidence and
retain, if necessary, expert forensic assistance;
(3) In order to be effective, the stipulation must be signed by the defendant and by
defense counsel. If either the defendant or defense counsel declines to stipulate, the
prosecution shall proceed with the presentation of live testimony, as required by the
United States Constitution, the State Constitution, and the applicable statutes and
rules of the State.
In theory, this procedure means less work for all parties than
the typical demand-oriented ipse dixit procedure. The State uses a
generic stipulation (probably a computer template) and inserts
particular forensic information already prepared by the crime
laboratory. Either party can opt out of the stipulation process with
relatively little effort. The prosecution can make an oral
representation that stipulation would interfere with its case
presentation. The defense can simply decline to sign the stipulation
without making extensive written submissions that "justify" the
insistence on full adversary testing of the State's evidence. 280
So, why do lawmakers choose the ipse dixit procedure over the
stipulation statute? The answer lies in the assumption of defense
inaction and its consequence for default outcomes under these
alternative statutes. Legislative drafters assume, probably correctly,
that the average, overworked public defender is more likely to do
280. The procedure also levels the playing field by empowering the defense to bargain away
rights in excl-ange for benefits. The prosecutor asks the defense to waive a right, in this case, the
right to confront and cross-examine the forensic witness and the right to have the government
prove the forensic test results. The defense can, in turn, request some concession from the
prosecution. Whether the bargain is struck will depend on how much each side values its
respective interest in litigating, or agreeing to, the forensic proof.
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nothing than something. 281 Legislators rely on this defense failure to
help prosecutors get cheaper convictions.
In the ipse dixit model, when the defense does nothing, law
enforcement, prosecutors, and judges do less work. In the stipulation
model, when the defense does nothing, law enforcement, prosecutors,
and judges do more work. In the ipse dixit model, the default outcome
reduces adversarial scrutiny. In the stipulation model, the default
outcome maintains the constitutional status quo: proof, beyond a
reasonable doubt, established through the testimony of state
witnesses who are confronted and cross-examined by the defense.
This is a powerful structural incentive. An adversarial
adjudication is costlier and riskier for the prosecution than an ipse
dixit rule that converts law enforcement claims into unadjudicable
facts.28 2 Moreover, in the ipse dixit procedures, the defense bears the
transactional costs of invoking adversary procedures. Since defense
attorneys often lack the time and money to support these transaction
costs, the defense foregoes, or fails to even consider pursuit of the
process.283  In short, the forensic ipse dixit procedures conserve
resources by relying upon defense passivity and by creating structural
disincentives for defense counsel to act.
B. Discouraging Public Discourse About Criminal Justice Policy
Constitutional cheating also has an important anti-democratic
cost. When the legislature hides the cost of prosecution and bets on
defense failures to maintain the cover, prosecutors avoid hard choices:
resource-based decisions about which cases to prosecute. In turn,
reducing the cost of prosecution helps legislators avoid difficult
determinations about which conduct ought to be criminalized.
281. Bureau of Justice statistics indicate that, in the country's 75 largest counties,
approximately 82 percent of felony defendants in state courts rely upon public defenders or
appointed legal counsel. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL
IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000).
282. See King & Klein, supra note 242, at 1488 ('Trial-like adjudication is more costly, more
time-consuming, and riskier for the government than judicial determinations at less formal
hearings."). Thus, when prosecutors lobby the legislature about adjudicative rules, they lobby for
rules that minimize cost, time, and risk. Professor Ron Wright suggests that prosecutors wield
less power in the lobbying process when they seek adjudicative changes than they do when they
seek increased punishment. Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Council and the
Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 258-59 (2004). This may reflect an honest
belief that the general public is best served by "better funding and more reliable results" in the
criminal justice system. Id. at 259.
283. See id. at 231 (asserting that differences in salary, workload, and support services
"combine to produce an overall gap in spending between the prosecution and defense functions").
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Instead, they simply legislate away some of the (constitutional) costs
of prosecution.
Ordinarily, a state's decision to prosecute an offense
necessarily implies its willingness to bear the associated costs of
prosecution: "Governments, both state and federal, quite properly
spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crimes. '28 4 A necessary corollary is that state funds will
support the defendant in his effort to defend himself.28 5 If states can
not or will not bear the cost of providing expert testimony in all of the
cases that prosecutors charge, let alone provide expert assistance to
individual defendants, then prosecutors and legislators must
reconsider how they wish to allocate their resources.
When legislatures, instead, cheat the Constitution to
compensate for underfunding crime laboratories and public defenders,
the subterfuge conceals the resource deficiency. This, in turn, stifles
public debate about how the legislative and executive branches should
allocate scarce resources.
Constitutional cheating not only disguises resource crises, but
it breaks faith with the presumption of constitutional compliance. For
example, the ipse dixit statutes help relieve prosecutors of their
traditional obligation to exercise prosecutorial discretion within
constitutional limits. Resource scarcity is one of the primary factors
driving the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Since prosecutors lack
the time (and the motivation) to pursue, with equal vigor, all criminal
violations, they routinely make policy decisions that prioritize a wide
variety of goals. A prosecutor might decide to devote scarce
prosecutorial and law enforcement resources to prosecuting child
abusers instead of pot smokers. In the alternative, a prosecutor might
choose to prosecute cases based on their prospective deterrent effect
rather than upon their particular immorality. However, when
constitutional cheating lessens resource constraints, providing
prosecutors with a bargain-basement price for proving forensic
elements, there is almost no incentive for prosecutors not to prosecute.
Prosecutorial discretion is checked by constitutional limits,
legislative repeals, and electoral politics. If the public dislikes a
prosecutor's choices, the public can vote the prosecutor out of office.
28 6
284. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
285. Id. However, Ake, which authorizes the appointment of experts to assist the defense,
has been read quite narrowly by courts. See Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and an Indigent
Defendant's 'Right' to an Expert Witness: A Promise Denied or Imagined?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 401, 452-58 (2002).
286. In the federal context, this requires voting the President out of office since the Attorney
General is appointed by the Chief Executive.
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If the legislature dislikes a prosecutor's choices, it can change the
substantive or procedural laws in a way that restricts those
prosecutorial choices. 28 7 And, if the prosecution dislikes legislative
funding choices, the prosecution can lobby the legislature, or appeal to
the public. Thus, constitutional cheating disguises resource scarcity,
discourages careful weighing of charging consequences, and breaks
faith with the presumption of public participation in prosecutorial
policy choices.
These institutional resource allocation questions have
traditionally been at the core of both our constitutional criminal
procedure and of the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis.
288
Indeed, these are precisely the sorts of political and institutional
checks and balances that should occur in the criminal justice system.
Thus, the system as a whole suffers when legislatures legislate away
constitutional protections in exchange for efficiency.
C. Promoting and Reinforcing Anti- Constitutional Practice Norms
Constitutional cheating dismantles a procedural architecture
that expresses core constitutional criminal procedure values.
Consider, for example, the due process principle that the prosecution
bears the burden of proof in a criminal case by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. In accordance with that principle, criminal trials
are ordered so that the prosecution presents its case first. This is not
merely a cosmetic organization of a case, nor a sympathetic nod to the
party that bears the burden of proof. Rather, this procedural ordering
of evidence is a functional structuring of proof that gives life to the
reasonable doubt standard. Similarly, the prosecution is required to
rest its case-that is, say "we're done for now"- before any defense
case begins. Judges can thereby consider the prosecution's case,
standing alone, weighed against the presumption of innocence.
When constitutional cheating reverses this procedural ordering
of evidence, it reverses normative expectations about allocation of the
burden of proof. This, in turn, promotes anti-constitutional
expectations and marginalizes those defendants who enforce their
287. But see Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 1973)
(suggesting that the legislature can preclude, but not compel, prosecutorial choices). That is, the
legislature can decriminalize certain conduct, thereby eliminating the possibility of prosecution.
However, a legislative choice to criminalize conduct does not have the corresponding effect of
forcing prosecution to charge those who may have engaged in that conduct.
288. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (noting that the government
has broad, though not unfettered, discretion in deciding whom to prosecute; this allows the
government to consider factors such as law enforcement priorities, resource conservation, and
case strength when deciding which cases to pursue).
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rights. For example, as discussed in Parts IV and V , the forensic ipse
dixit statutes make defendants responsible for earning the erstwhile
entitlement to cross-examination, and shift to defendants the burden
of rebutting the prosecution's forensic claims.
This, in turn, creates and promotes the perception that
adjudicative costs are created by the "difficult" defendant rather than
by prosecutorial choices to charge, and legislative choices to
criminalize and punish. For example, the purported reliability of
forensic tests is often invoked as a justification of the constitutional
cheating. 28 9 The suggestion is that cross-examination would have
been useless, so the constitutional cheating is inconsequential. 290 The
trivialization of fact-based focus on the State's proof also illustrates an
underlying hostility to acquittals based upon something other than
moral guilt. The elemental inquiry about the component parts of a
criminal offense: "can the prosecution prove each element?" becomes
subsidiary to the moral and factual inquiry: "did the defendant do it?"
regardless of whether the State can prove it.291
Moreover, the constitutional cheating has systemic
consequences that undermine structural constitutional incentives for
careful and honest police work. Practitioners and police officers know
that the likelihood of cross-examination provides an incentive for law
enforcement to keep careful and accurate records that support
prosecutorial claims. Thus, a system that focuses strongly on proof of
all elements, for example, by requiring stringent forensic proof, deters
sloppy or dishonest forensic work. However, when law enforcement
289. State v. Hancock, 825 P.2d 648, 651 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted) (noting that
the statute was enacted, in part, because of rarity of misidentification during drug testing).
290. See Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 142 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding that because field
tests indicated that the substance was cocaine, the laboratory test was cumulative and not a
"critical" piece of evidence; therefore, admission of the report in lieu of live testimony "would not
warrant habeas relief'); Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that the laboratory notes were trustworthy because they "concern[ed] mechanically objective
tests ... and were taken contemporaneously with the performance of the tests," because the
police chemist's supervisor testified that he checked the chemist's computation and that chemist
appeared to have followed standard lab procedures, and because the second police chemist
claimed to have verified the results); Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1020 (1987) (stating that there is little utility in cross-examination because the
chemists analyzed thousands of compounds each year and were unlikely to have independent
memory of any particular test; moreover, "production of the chemist who performed the test
'rarely leads to any admissions helpful to the party"' (quoting United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640,
643 (8th Cir. 1986))); accord United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 224 (5th Cir. 1995) ("We
cannot fathom what additional, enlightening information the district court could have gleaned
had [the parolee] been permitted to cross-examine the laboratory technicians.").
291. As discussed supra note 258 and accompanying text, this raises the question of whether




understands that the system is structured to reduce the focus on proof
of forensic evidence, it also understands that there will be few costs to
forensic corner-cutting and even fewer opportunities for forensic
frauds to be discovered.
D. Limiting Institutional Opportunities to Proctor Constitutional
Cheats
Constitutional cheating also illustrates our systemic
overdependence upon individual defendants and their attorneys to
proctor the criminal justice system. Our criminal justice system's
error-protecting features "depend for their enforcement on an
adequate level of litigation by defendants, meaning in practice by
defense counsel."292 The criminal "defendant's rights are really the
system's rules, rules that regulate the conduct of the various actors
who take part in the process by which some criminal defendants are
convicted and punished."
293
Structural aspects of our criminal justice system, however,
limit the extent to which defense attorneys can actually enforce
constitutional protections and proctor constitutional cheating. First,
constitutional rules are almost impossible to enforce when, in the vast
majority of cases, the accusation is resolved by guilty plea. However,
in the 95 percent of cases that resolve by way of plea bargain, the ipse
dixit statutes ensure that the parties bargain under the normative
assumption that the defendant cannot meaningfully hope to challenge
the State's forensic evidence.
Second, a fundamental tenet of the attorney-client relationship
is that counsel acts on behalf of the individual client and not on behalf
of future defendants or the system as whole. This results in both
parties to a criminal case preferring an individual resolution rather
than a litigated solution that affects the entire system.
When defense counsel catches the government cheating, her
responsibility is to leverage the identification of that cheat into a
positive outcome for her client. Prosecutors have an institutional
obligation to be sure that one remarkable defense case does not create
a litigated outcome that fundamentally alters procedural rules that
affect a large class of defendants. Accordingly, prosecutors have a
292. Stuntz, supra note 277, at 12. However, some of the most significant rights-enforcing
criminal procedure cases began as pro se litigations. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 337 (1963) (describing how petitioner originally represented himself). In the forensic ipse
dixit context, some of the appellate and post-conviction litigation arises out of an allegation that
counsel failed to consult the client about the decision not to challenge the forensic evidence.
293. Stuntz, supra note 277, at 12.
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strong incentive to forego litigation of constitutional cheats in
individual cases: the institutional costs associated with an adverse
appellate ruling are simply too high. Smart prosecutors will agree to
follow constitutional norms in a limited number of individual cases,
rather than risk an appellate ruling that precludes all future use of
the constitutional cheat at issue.294 This reality reduces the likelihood
that one attorney's identification and enforcement of a constitutional
right will have a significant systemic enforcement effect. 295
Even if one attorney successfully raises the constitutional
issues, there are jurisprudential barriers to deterring future
legislative cheats. For example, the prohibition against mandatory
presumptions reflects a policy concern that the legislative branch
must be restrained from substituting its legislative judgment for "the
factfinder's responsibility at trial.., to find the ultimate facts beyond
a reasonable doubt."296 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court looks
to the language of the actual jury charge, rather than the language of
the statute, to determine whether a particular case presents a
violation of the rule against mandatory presumptions. 297 Whether a
presumption is permissive or mandatory depends upon "the words
actually spoken to the jury."298 Thus, regardless of how egregiously a
statute violates the rule against mandatory presumptions, whether a
court will strike down a statute as violative of the Due Process Clause
depends entirely on "the way in which a reasonable juror could have
interpreted" the presumption instruction actually given to a jury.299
The "actual language" rule creates a tree-falling-in-the-forest
puzzle: is an unconstitutional statute unconstitutional if no court ever
says so? 30 0 For example, assume a defendant pleads guilty based, in
294. In the alternative, a smart prosecutor might offer plea-bargaining concessions
responsive to the defendant's particular complaint.
295. While better information-sharing among defense attorneys might improve this problem,
perhaps the individual nature of the defense attorney's role necessitates an institutional
response that grants standing to someone responsible for litigating these issues outside of the
traditional adversary system. Indeed, courts have resisted the idea that an individual defendant
can seek to enforce a constitutional directive to the legislature, State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780,
786 (La. 1993), and have been similarly loathe to permit criminal defense attorneys to file claims
on behalf of prospective clients, Kowalski v. Tesmer, 125 S.Ct. 564, 570 (2004).
296. County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). This Article is
largely couched in terms of the Due Process Clause, the traditional basis for the reasonable
doubt standard. Recent Supreme Court cases, such as Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker/Fanfan,
suggest that the academic and practical literature should reexamine the Sixth Amendment as
another supplemental or independent source for the reasonable doubt rule.
297. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979).
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. I am indebted to Professor Darryl Brown for the "tree-falling-in-the-forest" metaphor.
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part, upon his assumption that he cannot successfully undermine the
prima facie force of the laboratory report. Is the statute
unconstitutional in the absence of a soft, specific unconstitutional jury
instruction provided to a particular jury in a particular case?
The puzzle's complexity increases exponentially when
legislatures fail to respond to the relevant jurisprudence. Consider,
for example, the status of forensic ipse dixit cases in Massachusetts.
In 1989, defendant Johnson was convicted at trial after the
government relied upon a forensic ipse dixit statute to prove an
element ofthe offense. Following the relevant statutory language, the
trial court instructed the jury that the crime laboratory report was "by
law... prima facie evidence" 30 1 that they "must accept... unless
there has been evidence to rebut it."302 The court further explained
that "unless there is evidence to show that that analysis as performed
and carried in that sheet [offered by the prosecution] is some other
substance, then you must accept that it has been analyzed and found
to be cocaine."
303
On review, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the
instructions created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.
30 4
The legislature, however, failed to amend the statute. Accordingly,
the relevant statute still contains the constitutionally offensive prima
facie language. 30 5 What then are we to make of guilty pleas obtained
under the statute, post-Johnson?
306
301. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (1988).
302. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 N.E.2d 248, 248 (Mass. 1989); see also Commonwealth
v. Claudio, 541 N.E.2d 993, 994 (1989) ("You must accept that presumption unless there is any
evidence to the contrary to rebut that presumption. That's what prima facie evidence means. It
carries with it a presumption that stands unless there is evidence to rebut that presumption. So,
you have with you the analysis sheets and they constitute prima facie evidence, carrying the
presumption that the drugs are heroin, and in the weight specified within those sheets.").
303. Johnson, 542 N.E.2d at 248. This instruction is not an anomalous interpretation of the
prima facie language.
304. Id. at 249. The court affirmed the conviction, however, since the issue had not been
preserved by the defendant's objection and the error was deemed harmless. Id.
305. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2005).
306. The likelihood of meaningful appellate redress is further reduced by the harmless error
standard that applies to Confrontation Clause violations. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 684 (1986) ('The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the
cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."). A Confrontation Clause violation is harmless "if the
violation did not contribute to the verdict 'beyond a reasonable doubt."' Sarah A. Stauffer, Sixth
Amendment at Trial, 87 GEO. L.J. 1641, 1657 (1999). As a result, Crawford violations may be




The forensic ipse dixit phenomenon reviewed in this Article
represents far more than an unwarranted legislative confidence in the
accuracy of science and its practice in state crime laboratories.
Rather, the forensic ipse dixit phenomenon illustrates a dangerous
game of constitutional smoke and mirrors. In the guise of resource
conservation, lawmakers are chipping away at the procedural
foundations of constitutional criminal procedure. State legislatures
have created rules that help prosecutors cheat their way'to quicker
and cheaper convictions. Under-litigation and under-enforcement by
defense attorneys and judges, respectively, prevents successful
proctoring of the criminal process; accordingly, the constitutional
cheating succeeds on a spectacular level.307 In the wake of recent
Supreme Court decisions like Crawford, we can hope that courts will
vigorously enforce the Sixth Amendment guarantees that should serve
as prophylactics against constitutional cheating and its consequences.
Successful judicial proctoring of constitutional cheats, however,
requires that litigants first deconstruct the rhetorical artifice that
masks the statutory subterfuge. Like any other kind of cheating,
constitutional cheating secretly flouts the rules and gives the cheater
an unwarranted advantage over the game's other players. To date,
the cheaters are winning. Whether the cheaters will succeed remains
to be seen.
307. The ABA Criminal Justice Section Subcommittee on Forensic Science belies that only
"adequate funding, accreditation of crime laboratories and medical examiner offices, certification
of examiners, standardization and publication of procedures, comprehensive and reciprocal
pretrial discovery of expert testimony, defense access to experts for indigents, and training of
lawyers in forensic science" will rectify the forensic evidence crisis." Raeder, supra note 91, at
1320.
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